<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:times new roman, new york, times, serif;font-size:12pt"><div><span>Hi David,<br></span></div><div><br><blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; margin-top: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"> <div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897465" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"> <div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897467" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"> <div dir="ltr"> <font face="Arial" size="2"> <hr size="1"> <b><span style="font-weight:bold;">De :</span></b> David L Wetzell <wetzelld@gmail.com><br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">À :</span></b> election-methods@lists.electorama.com <br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Envoyé le :</span></b> Lundi 20 février 2012 13h18<br> <b><span style="font-weight: bold;">Objet :</span></b> Re: [EM] Kevin V,
Richard F., Raph F<br> </font> </div> <br><div id="yiv293985320"><div class="yiv293985320gmail_quote"><blockquote class="yiv293985320gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;"><br>From: Kevin Venzke <<a rel="nofollow" ymailto="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr" target="_blank" href="mailto:stepjak@yahoo.fr">stepjak@yahoo.fr</a>><br>To: election-methods <<a rel="nofollow" ymailto="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com" target="_blank" href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com">election-methods@electorama.com</a>><br>
Cc: <br>Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2012 03:01:06 +0000 (GMT)<br>Subject: Re: [EM] Kevin V.<br>Hi David,<br>
<br>
>>KV:The similarity is that with SODA, you (and like-minded candidates) get a benefit even if you don't<br>
>>win. Under normal methods you have the inherent pressure against running clones (that I think we both<br>
>>agree exists) with little possible benefit in nominating them.<br>
><br>
>dlw: What is the benefit? You might get lucky? There'd be pressure in real life against clones running<br>
>regardless and so the strength of the effect is still an empirical question. <br>
<br>
The benefits are<br>
1. to the candidate: still gets to influence the result even if he loses<br>
2. to the voter: greater chance of having somebody palatable to vote for without wasting the vote<br>
3. to the candidate's party: the candidate can attract voters that might not have bothered voting if there<br>
had only been one nominee.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: If it's really a clone then 2 seem like a stretch. For 1 and 3, why not just hire more campaign staff to GOTV? <br><br></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>They're clones in the sense that they come from the same party and are expected to transfer votes to each other</div><div>once they lose.</div><div><br></div><div>I don't understand how you're responding to 1. That point is saying that even if I only get 5% of the vote I still</div><div>have some influence in who will win.</div><div><br></div><div>Regarding 3: This is related to 2. If the voter likes Cain and hates Gingrich you can't simply hire more staff to make <br></div><div>him like Gingrich instead.<br><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897465" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897467" style="font-family: times new roman,new
york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div id="yiv293985320"><div class="yiv293985320gmail_quote"><div><br></div></div></div></div></div><blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; margin-top: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897465" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897467" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div id="yiv293985320"><div class="yiv293985320gmail_quote"><div><br></div><blockquote class="yiv293985320gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<br>
The main factor working against nominating clones in most methods is that it risks dividing up the voters<br>
such that they refuse to vote for all the like-minded candidates. If voters actually delegate power to a candidate<br>
(which is a little uncertain) the risk of this is reduced.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: It also imposes higher costs on voters in terms of getting to know the candidates and figuring out that so-and-so are clones... <br><br></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>Yes, under most methods it does, because the voters would have to list all the clones for it to count.<br><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897465" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897467" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div id="yiv293985320"><div class="yiv293985320gmail_quote"><div><br></div></div></div></div></div><blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; margin-top: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897465" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div
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<blockquote class="yiv293985320gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<br>>>By "difficult to tabulate" I was talking about IRV itself. But no matter:<br>
><br>
>dlw: Maybe that's why I'm pushing IRV+???<br>
<br>
Ok, maybe I should take that literally, that you want to use an approval filter because it makes IRV easier<br>
to tabulate. I don't know what else the lack of example scenarios could mean.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>My motivation is pragmatic, or problem-solving driven, rather than based on stylized hypotheticals.. <br><br></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>Ok. In reference to the approval component I can believe that.<br><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897465" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897467" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div id="yiv293985320"><div class="yiv293985320gmail_quote"><div><br></div></div></div></div></div><blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; margin-top: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897465" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897467" style="font-family: times
new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div id="yiv293985320"><div class="yiv293985320gmail_quote"><div><br></div>
<blockquote class="yiv293985320gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<br>
>>KV:Ok, so you are married to IRV or variants because of its "first mover" status. Then my question switches<br>
>>to how the approval rule helps it. Do you have a scenario on-hand that shows your method doing something<br>
>>preferable to what IRV normally would do? I can't think of what the expected difference would be, except<br>
>>when somehow the second-place (on first preferences) candidate isn't among the top three approved. Are<br>
>>you thinking of a Chirac/Jospin/Le Pen scenario (2002 French presidential election)? Though that would<br>
>>not even have happened under IRV.<br>
><br>
>dlw: Speeding up the election and simplifying the use of IRV are enuf to justify the use of IRV+ over IRV,<br>
>especially for bigger elections. It doesn't matter how often it'd get a different outcome. There'd be no recursion<br>
>in the explanation of how it'd work and that'd be one less arg that opponents of electoral reform could use<br>
>against it. <br>
>Plus, almost all of the args used by advocates of Approval Voting against IRV would get watered down...,<br>
>cuz the simple fact of the matter is that IRV works best with only 3 candidates. <br>
<br>
I don't buy that second paragraph at all. Contrived IRV bad examples usually don't need more than three.<br>
Do you know one that requires four?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: Well, it's the least important for me personally of the args, hence why it's listed last.</div>
<div>It's easiest to give bad egs with 3 candidates. That doesn't mean they don't also exist for more than 3. <br><br>If you know of examples where order of elimination matters in a cascading fashion then that'd make a great example for IRV+. </div><div>As for IRV working best with only 3 candidates, the pathological examples emerge only in the relatively rare case of competitive 3 way elections</div>
<div>and those are relatively rare and not stable so the use of less ranking info by IRV relative to Condorcet methods would be less important w. only 3 candidates and so on...<br><br></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div>Ok.<br><br>I'm not too sure what else can be said, if you're mainly trying to simplify a method that you see yourself as forced to pick.<br><br><div><blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; margin-top: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897465" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897467" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div id="yiv293985320"><div class="yiv293985320gmail_quote"><blockquote class="yiv293985320gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
I don't think that any parties so at odds with the Democrats or Republicans<br>
that they can't run under those labels, are the parties we are looking for.<br>
<br>
I think that if, under whatever rules were in place, there were room for three<br>
contenders in an election, you would find not-too-unfamiliar-looking candidates<br>
taking the third spot and trying to beat the Ds and Rs. With this situation, it<br>
is at least possible that a general viewpoint (about as coherent as those of<br>
the Ds and Rs) would come together and allow a third "party" including a label<br>
for it.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: But most voter perceptions are endogenous or manipulated via the mis-information that is rampant in politics and those who benefit </div><div>from the current 2-party system own the MSM that is the greatest purveyor of mis-information. <br><br></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>I don't think I have any ideas for addressing this.</div><div><br><blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16, 16, 255); margin-left: 5px; margin-top: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897465" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897467" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div id="yiv293985320"><div class="yiv293985320gmail_quote"><blockquote class="yiv293985320gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
<br>
It isn't obvious that a three-way race will still fight over the center though.<br>
I am interested to study this, but it seems very hard to study voter strategy<br>
and nomination strategy at the same time.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: This is why I'm diffident over results derived from stylized examples or simulations, like Bayesian Regret. It's not just a matter of tweaking the parameters, the fundamental design of the election is hard to capture deterministically w.o. lots of ad hoc assumptions. <br><br></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote>It's good to be skeptical of simulations. But they're useful for showing how the world might work given a set of assumptions.</div><div><br></div><div>A lot of assumptions aren't quite right but can be accepted to some extent anyway. For instance I typically run elections where 3 candidates</div><div>and the voters are dropped randomly on a 1D spectrum. That's not reality, but if a method does badly in that setting, I would still think it's</div><div>worth looking into why.<br></div><br><div><br><blockquote style="border-left: 2px solid rgb(16,
16, 255); margin-left: 5px; margin-top: 5px; padding-left: 5px;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897465" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div class="yui_3_2_0_14_132980634897467" style="font-family: times new roman,new york,times,serif; font-size: 12pt;"><div id="yiv293985320"><div class="yiv293985320gmail_quote"><blockquote class="yiv293985320gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">
If party discipline were strengthened (though I can't imagine how that would<br>
happen) I expect it would force some current Ds and Rs to leave and form new<br>
minor parties. But I don't think this in itself would benefit voters much. I<br>
think it would mean for many that there is even less of a real choice.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>If there's no brand-protection via intra-party discipline then many of our perceived choices are not real choices as it is...<br><br></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div>There is some "brand-protection" because you can't get the nomination of a party if it doesn't seem that you'll be of any help once elected.<br><br>But I prefer not to vote by party label.<br><div><br></div><div>Kevin</div><div><br></div><br></div></body></html>