[EM] SODA arguments
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Fri Feb 17 16:38:58 PST 2012
Just a few thoughts.
De : Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>À : EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>; electionsciencefoundation <electionscience at googlegroups.com>
>Envoyé le : Vendredi 17 février 2012 9h20
>Objet : [EM] SODA arguments
For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters will beat all other systems, including Range/Approval.
I guess you will have a hard time arguing this, especially if you have multiple audiences. For instance, whether Range/Approval
are even all that great is controversial. But if you're an anti-majoritarian type or think it's unfair/unrealistic to propose that voters
are strategic, I guess that SODA looks like a step down.
Didn't you post an example where SODA declined to elect a "weak CW" that you said was actually a good thing? If that's
true, I guess some people won't agree with that.
It seems to me that there would be a lot more candidates under SODA. It's pretty hard to spoil the race and there is benefit to
be had in receiving some votes. It seems parliamentary that way. How many supporters is too few to consider running?
(I have a simple rule for cutting down the number of candidates. I don't think I've ever mentioned it because I know how
idealistic you all are. Just say that the first-preference winner auto-wins if he has more first preferences than second and third
place combined. This can make it risky even to compete for third place. The idea is that voters should definitely then realize
which candidates are the top three in their race, which could amount to a viability/visibility boost for #3. My rule assumes
there's no equal-ranking, but I bet something could be devised for other ballots.)
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