[EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
James Gilmour
jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk
Fri Feb 17 16:00:04 PST 2012
I don't see why anyone would want to use a party-list voting system when there are more voter-centred alternatives that fit much
better with the political cultures of countries like USA, Canada, UK. Why anyone would want to use the Hare quota when, with
preferential voting, it can distort the proportionality - in a way that Droop does not. Why anyone would want to restrict the
voting system to 3-seat districts instead of adopting a flexible approach to district magnitude to fit local geography and
recognised communities..
James Gilmour
-----Original Message-----
From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of David L
Wetzell
Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 9:21 PM
To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
I give a rebuttal to the Electoral Reform Society's assessment of party-list PR for the case of 3-seat LR Hare.
http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html
dlw
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 2:54 PM, David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com> wrote:
From: Richard Fobes <ElectionMethods at VoteFair.org>
To: election-methods at electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 12:01:16 -0800
Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
On 2/17/2012 6:49 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:
...
It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked
choices or party-list PR. ...
So what do you think?
I don't see this as an either/or choice,
dlw: U2 apparently are not among most folks...
nor do I see a viable "both" option being suggested.
dlw: viability is a low-blow at this stage, but I guess it's a blow I use quite often.
So I'll again suggest VoteFair ranking:
VoteFair ranking uses "ranked choices" (1-2-3 ballots and pairwise counting...) for identifying the most popular candidate -- for
filling the first seat in a legislative district.
VoteFair ranking fills the second district-based seat with the "second-most representative" candidate. In the U.S., even without
asking voters to indicate a party preference, that would usually be the most popular candidate from the opposite party (i.e. the
opposite party compared to the first-seat winner).
To further increase proportionality, VoteFair ranking fills some proportional seats based on the favorite party of the voters.
(Whichever party has the biggest gap between voter proportion and filled-seat proportion wins the next seat.)
We don't have to choose between proportionality (PR) and ranked methods. We can get both. And in a U.S.-compatible way.
If election-method reform is to happen in the U.S., it has to merge with the reality of the two-party system. And I believe it
should accommodate third parties only to the extent that voters are unable to regain control of the two main parties.
dlw: I agree with the reality of the 2-party system. I also believe that we need to make the case that our 2-party system will work
much, much better if we give 3rd parties a constructive role to play in it. Giving them access to one-third of the seats in the
state assembly so they get to determine which major party is in power in that body every two years is such a constructive role. It
will give folks more exit threat from the two major parties, thereby making both of them more responsive to the moving center.
As for STV, going beyond two seats easily produces unfair results. And in the U.S. the results also would be quite unstable (i.e.
not mesh well with the current two-party system).
Can you elaborate?
I don't see why 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota wouldn't have results like what you described that would maintain yet transform the
US's 2-party system.
dlw
Richard Fobes
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
To: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
Cc: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 14:35:58 -0600
Subject: Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true.
Jameson
2012/2/17 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It
wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory.
But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are
of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped
up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage.
dlw
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, <election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
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Today's Topics:
1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma?
(Kristofer Munsterhjelm)
2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell)
3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn)
4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn)
5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour)
6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze)
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>
To: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100
Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma?
On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken
dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma.
Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either
plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would
have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two
"vote splitting" factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred
each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood
and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to
cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000
doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not
have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the
most self-consistent counts of Florida.
Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the
property would remain in a singlewinner context.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Cc:
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600
Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the
elections.
Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US. I'm
not complaining because it's good to simplify things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to
make sure that 3rd parties get a constructive role to play in US politics.
So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and
transferring process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and
aldermen elections. The latter two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter attention. Is it reasonable
to expect voters to rank multiple candidates in an election where they often simply vote their party line? Why not keep it simple
and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested?
It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of context and
that both can be useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare election. The vice-candidates who
would hold the extra seats a party wins could either be selected after the victory or specified before hand.
So what do you think?
I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those in power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and I'm not
sure they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to voting the candidate and having their representative and they could keep that
if there are relatively few seats per election.
dlw
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>, electionsciencefoundation <electionscience at googlegroups.com>
Cc:
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:20:20 -0600
Subject: [EM] SODA arguments
For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100%
strategic voters will beat all other systems, including Range/Approval.
For those who feel that Condorcet compliance is the be-all-and-end-all, a majority Condorcet winner, or any Condorcet winner with 3
candidates and full candidate preferences, is not just the winner with honest votes, but in all cases the strategically-forced
winner; this contrasts with Condorcet systems, in which strategy can cause even majority- or 3-candidate- CWs to lose.
For those who feel that strategic resistance is the most important, SODA is unmatched. It meets FBC, solves the chicken dilemma, has
no burial incentive (ie, meets later-no-help), and even meets later-no-harm for the two most-approved candidates (where it matters
most). It's monotonic, and I believe (haven't proven) that it meets consistency. It meets participation, cloneproofness, and IIA for
up to 4 candidates.
For those "middlebrows" who most value a system's acceptability to current incumbents, SODA is top-of-the-line. It allows voters to
vote plurality-style and, if two parties are clearly favored by voters, allows those two parties to prevent a weak centrist from
winning, even if polarization is so high that the centrist is an apparent Condorcet winner.
For those who want simplicity: while it's true that the SODA counting process is more complicated than approval, the process of
voting is actually simpler than any other system, because you can just vote for your favorite candidate. For the majority who agrees
with their favorite candidate's preferences, there is no strategic need to watch the polls and figure out who the frontrunners are,
and no nail-biting dilemma of whether to rank others as equal to your favorite.
And for those who balk at delegation, SODA allows any voter to cast a direct, undelegated ballot; and allows those voters who do
delegate to know how their vote will be used. Refusing to consider SODA because you don't want to delegate, is like refusing to walk
into a candy store because you don't like chocolate; SODA allows, not requires, delegation.
I think pretty much everybody on this list falls into one or more of the above categories. So, what's not to like about SODA?
Jameson
ps. I clarified the SODA procedure
<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA_voting_(Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval)#Full.2C_step-by-step_rules> on the wiki, though
there were no substantive changes. I improved the formatting, marked the steps which are optional, and better explained that winning
candidates use their delegated votes first because precisely because they will probably choose not to approve others.
Comments are welcome.
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
To: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:26:33 -0600
Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR.
I don't. I think that party-list removes voter freedom, and ranked choices is too much of a burden on the voter. While either would
be better than what we have, I prefer to use delegation a la SODA.
Thus my favored system is PAL representation <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation> . It's true that PAL still has
some (very attenuated) party-list-like aspects, because party affiliation is used to match candidates to districts at the end; but
if you were willing to give up this (overlapping) geographical representation aspect of PAL, you could make a similar delegated PR
system in which parties played no explicit role.
Jameson
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "James Gilmour" <jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk>
To: "'David L Wetzell'" <wetzelld at gmail.com>, "'EM'" <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
Cc:
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 18:01:55 -0000
Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
But why would you want all these differences and complications?
If you are going to use STV-PR for some of these elections, why not use STV-PR for all of these elections to the various
"representative assemblies" (councils, state legislatures, US House of Representatives, US Senate). STV-PR works OK in both
partisan and non-partisan elections, so it should give fair and proper representation of the VOTERS in all these different
elections.
Of course, with districts returning only 3 to 5 members, the proportionality and direct representation MAY be a little limited, but
if small numbers are needed to make the system acceptable to the vested interests, then so be it. STV-PR with 3, 4 or 5 member
districts is greatly to be preferred to plurality in single-member districts and to plurality at large. We had to accept local
government wards electing only 3 or 4 councillors as part of our STV-PR package - that's practical politics. But that reform has
transformed our local government - no more "one-party states".
James Gilmour
> -----Original Message-----
> From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
> [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On
> Behalf Of David L Wetzell
> Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 2:49 PM
> To: EM
> Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
>
>
> It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base
> which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed
> about the elections.
>
> Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types
> of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in
> the US. I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify
> things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR
> Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a
> constructive role to play in US politics.
>
> So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps
> using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the
> vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional
> elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for
> state representative and aldermen elections. The latter two
> elections are less important and get less media coverage and
> voter attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank
> multiple candidates in an election where they often simply
> vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and use the
> mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's
> duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested?
>
> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between
> ranked choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of
> context and that both can be useful, especially when no
> explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare
> election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats
> a party wins could either be selected after the victory or
> specified before hand.
>
> So what do you think?
>
> I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those
> in power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and
> I'm not sure they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to
> voting the candidate and having their representative and they
> could keep that if there are relatively few seats per election.
>
> dlw
>
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: "Markus Schulze" <Markus.Schulze at alumni.TU-Berlin.DE>
To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 19:27:05 +0100
Subject: Re: [EM] Question about Schulze beatpath method
Hallo,
it can happen that the weakest link in the strongest path
from candidate A to candidate B and the weakest link in the
strongest path from candidate B to candidate A is the same link,
say CD.
I recommend that, in this case, the link CD should be declared
"forbidden" and the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B
and the strongest path from candidate B to candidate A, that does
not contain a "forbidden" link, should be calculated. If again the
weakest link in the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B
and the weakest link in the strongest path from candidate B to
candidate A is the same link (say EF), then also this link should
be declared "forbidden" and the paths from A to B and from B to A
should be calculated. This should be repeated until the weakest
link in the strongest path from A to B and the weakest link in the
strongest path from B to A are different links.
Markus Schulze
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