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<DIV><SPAN class=031225423-17022012><FONT color=#0000ff size=2 face=Arial>I
don't see why anyone would want to use a party-list voting system when there are
more voter-centred alternatives that fit much better with the political cultures
of countries like USA, Canada, UK. Why anyone would want to use the
Hare quota when, with preferential voting, it can distort the
proportionality - in a way that Droop does not. Why anyone would
want to restrict the voting system to 3-seat districts instead of adopting a
flexible approach to district magnitude to fit local geography and recognised
communities..</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<DIV><SPAN class=031225423-17022012><FONT color=#0000ff size=2 face=Arial>James
Gilmour</FONT></SPAN></DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #0000ff 2px solid; PADDING-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-LEFT: 5px; MARGIN-RIGHT: 0px"
dir=ltr>
<DIV></DIV>
<DIV dir=ltr lang=en-us class=OutlookMessageHeader align=left><FONT size=2
face=Tahoma>-----Original Message-----<BR><B>From:</B>
election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com] <B>On Behalf Of
</B>David L Wetzell<BR><B>Sent:</B> Friday, February 17, 2012 9:21
PM<BR><B>To:</B> election-methods@lists.electorama.com<BR><B>Subject:</B> Re:
[EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?<BR><BR></FONT></DIV>I give a
rebuttal to the Electoral Reform Society's assessment of party-list PR for the
case of 3-seat LR Hare.
<DIV><A
href="http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html">http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html</A> </DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>dlw<BR><BR>
<DIV class=gmail_quote>On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 2:54 PM, David L Wetzell <SPAN
dir=ltr><<A
href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com">wetzelld@gmail.com</A>></SPAN> wrote:<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote><BR><BR>
<DIV class=gmail_quote>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>From: Richard Fobes
<ElectionMethods@VoteFair.org><BR>To: <A
href="mailto:election-methods@electorama.com"
target=_blank>election-methods@electorama.com</A><BR>Cc: <BR>Date: Fri,
17 Feb 2012 12:01:16 -0800
<DIV class=im><BR>Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could
context matter?<BR></DIV>On 2/17/2012 6:49 AM, David L Wetzell wrote:<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>...
<DIV class=im><BR>It seems to me that most folks think the choice is
between ranked<BR></DIV>choices or party-list PR. ...
<DIV class=im><BR><BR>So what do you think?<BR></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE><BR>I
don't see this as an either/or choice,</BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>dlw: U2 apparently are not among most folks...</DIV>
<DIV> </DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>nor do I see a viable "both" option being
suggested.<BR></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>dlw: viability is a low-blow at this stage, but I guess it's a blow I
use quite often. </DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote><BR>So I'll again suggest VoteFair
ranking:<BR><BR>VoteFair ranking uses "ranked choices" (1-2-3 ballots and
pairwise counting...) for identifying the most popular candidate -- for
filling the first seat in a legislative district.<BR><BR>VoteFair ranking
fills the second district-based seat with the "second-most representative"
candidate. In the U.S., even without asking voters to indicate a
party preference, that would usually be the most popular candidate from
the opposite party (i.e. the opposite party compared to the first-seat
winner).<BR><BR>To further increase proportionality, VoteFair ranking
fills some proportional seats based on the favorite party of the voters.
(Whichever party has the biggest gap between voter proportion and
filled-seat proportion wins the next seat.)<BR><BR>We don't have to choose
between proportionality (PR) and ranked methods. We can get both.
And in a U.S.-compatible way.<BR><BR>If election-method reform is to
happen in the U.S., it has to merge with the reality of the two-party
system. And I believe it should accommodate third parties only to
the extent that voters are unable to regain control of the two main
parties.<BR></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>dlw: I agree with the reality of the 2-party system. I also
believe that we need to make the case that our 2-party system will work
much, much better if we give 3rd parties a constructive role to play in it.
Giving them access to one-third of the seats in the state assembly so
they get to determine which major party is in power in that body every two
years is such a constructive role. It will give folks more exit threat
from the two major parties, thereby making both of them more responsive to
the moving center.</DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote><BR>As for STV, going beyond two seats easily produces
unfair results. And in the U.S. the results also would be quite
unstable (i.e. not mesh well with the current two-party
system).<BR></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>Can you elaborate?</DIV>
<DIV>I don't see why 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota wouldn't have results
like what you described that would maintain yet transform the US's 2-party
system.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>dlw</DIV>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote><BR>Richard Fobes<BR><BR><BR><BR><BR>----------
Forwarded message ----------<BR>From: Jameson Quinn <<A
href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com"
target=_blank>jameson.quinn@gmail.com</A>><BR>To: David L Wetzell
<<A href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com"
target=_blank>wetzelld@gmail.com</A>><BR>Cc: <A
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
target=_blank>election-methods@lists.electorama.com</A><BR>Date: Fri,
17 Feb 2012 14:35:58 -0600<BR>Subject: Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA<BR>If
first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with
plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true.
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>Jameson<BR><BR>
<DIV class=gmail_quote>2012/2/17 David L Wetzell <SPAN dir=ltr><<A
href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com"
target=_blank>wetzelld@gmail.com</A>></SPAN><BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to
catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it.
It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you
that it was hunky-dory.
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as
many serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of
SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing
problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the
seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval
voting in the first stage.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>dlw</DIV>
<DIV><BR>
<DIV class=gmail_quote>On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, <SPAN
dir=ltr><<A
href="mailto:election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com"
target=_blank>election-methods-request@lists.electorama.com</A>></SPAN>
wrote:<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions
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"Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."<BR><BR>Today's
Topics:<BR><BR> 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken
dilemma?<BR> (Kristofer Munsterhjelm)<BR> 2.
STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L
Wetzell)<BR> 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn)<BR> 4. Re:
STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn)<BR>
5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James
Gilmour)<BR> 6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method
(Markus Schulze)<BR><BR><BR>---------- Forwarded message
----------<BR>From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <<A
href="mailto:km_elmet@lavabit.com"
target=_blank>km_elmet@lavabit.com</A>><BR>To: Jameson Quinn
<<A href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com"
target=_blank>jameson.quinn@gmail.com</A>><BR>Cc: EM <<A
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
target=_blank>election-methods@lists.electorama.com</A>><BR>Date: Fri,
17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100<BR>Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world
examples of chicken dilemma?<BR>On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn
wrote:<BR>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA
and the chicken<BR>dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples
of the dilemma.<BR>Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not
possible with either<BR>plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for
cases that arguably would<BR>have been a chicken dilemma under
approval. That means that the two<BR>"vote splitting" factions would
almost certainly have clearly preferred<BR>each other to the
opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood<BR>and a
close enough balance that they could easily have failed
to<BR>cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example;
US-Pres-2000<BR>doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed
that they would not<BR>have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won
both the popular vote and the<BR>most self-consistent counts of
Florida.<BR></BLOCKQUOTE><BR>Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That
*was* Approval. Granted, it was used to elect more than one candidate,
but you could argue the property would remain in a singlewinner
context.
<DIV class=im><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR>---------- Forwarded message
----------<BR>From: David L Wetzell <<A
href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com"
target=_blank>wetzelld@gmail.com</A>><BR>To: EM <<A
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
target=_blank>election-methods@lists.electorama.com</A>><BR>Cc: <BR>Date: Fri,
17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600<BR>Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR,
could context matter?<BR>It seems to me that a common sense solution
would be to base which gets used on the propensity for voters to be
informed about the elections.
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of
quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US.
I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify things.
But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might
prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a constructive role to
play in US politics.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using
AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and
transferring process, for US congressional elections or city council
elections and 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen
elections. The latter two elections are less important and get
less media coverage and voter attention. Is it reasonable to
expect voters to rank multiple candidates in an election where they
often simply vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and
use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's
duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested?</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked
choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of context and
that both can be useful, especially when no explicit party-list is
required for a 3-seat LR Hare election. The vice-candidates who
would hold the extra seats a party wins could either be selected after
the victory or specified before hand. </DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>So what do you think?</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those in
power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and I'm not sure
they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to voting the candidate
and having their representative and they could keep that if there are
relatively few seats per election.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>dlw</DIV><BR><BR></DIV>---------- Forwarded message
----------<BR>From: Jameson Quinn <<A
href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com"
target=_blank>jameson.quinn@gmail.com</A>><BR>To: EM <<A
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
target=_blank>election-methods@lists.electorama.com</A>>,
electionsciencefoundation <<A
href="mailto:electionscience@googlegroups.com"
target=_blank>electionscience@googlegroups.com</A>><BR>Cc: <BR>Date: Fri,
17 Feb 2012 09:20:20 -0600<BR>Subject: [EM] SODA arguments<BR>
<DIV>For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all
measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic
voters will beat all other systems, including
Range/Approval. </DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>For those who feel that Condorcet compliance is the
be-all-and-end-all, a majority Condorcet winner, or any Condorcet
winner with 3 candidates and full candidate preferences, is not just
the winner with honest votes, but in all cases the
strategically-forced winner; this contrasts with Condorcet systems, in
which strategy can cause even majority- or 3-candidate- CWs to
lose. </DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>For those who feel that strategic resistance is the most
important, SODA is unmatched. It meets FBC, solves the chicken
dilemma, has no burial incentive (ie, meets later-no-help), and even
meets later-no-harm for the two most-approved candidates (where it
matters most). It's monotonic, and I believe (haven't proven) that it
meets consistency. It meets participation, cloneproofness, and IIA for
up to 4 candidates.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>For those "middlebrows" who most value a system's acceptability
to current incumbents, SODA is top-of-the-line. It allows voters to
vote plurality-style and, if two parties are clearly favored by
voters, allows those two parties to prevent a weak centrist from
winning, even if polarization is so high that the centrist is an
apparent Condorcet winner.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>For those who want simplicity: while it's true that the SODA
counting process is more complicated than approval, the process of
voting is actually simpler than any other system, because you can just
vote for your favorite candidate. For the majority who agrees with
their favorite candidate's preferences, there is no strategic need to
watch the polls and figure out who the frontrunners are, and no
nail-biting dilemma of whether to rank others as equal to your
favorite.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>And for those who balk at delegation, SODA allows any voter to
cast a direct, undelegated ballot; and allows those voters who do
delegate to know how their vote will be used. Refusing to consider
SODA because you don't want to delegate, is like refusing to walk into
a candy store because you don't like chocolate; SODA allows, not
requires, delegation.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>I think pretty much everybody on this list falls into one or more
of the above categories. So, what's not to like about SODA?</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>Jameson</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV>ps. I clarified the <A
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA_voting_(Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval)#Full.2C_step-by-step_rules"
target=_blank>SODA procedure</A> on the wiki, though there were
no substantive changes. I improved the formatting, marked the steps
which are optional, and better explained that winning candidates use
their delegated votes first because precisely because they will
probably choose not to approve others.
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV>Comments are welcome.</DIV>
<DIV class=im><BR><BR>---------- Forwarded message
----------<BR>From: Jameson Quinn <<A
href="mailto:jameson.quinn@gmail.com"
target=_blank>jameson.quinn@gmail.com</A>><BR>To: David L
Wetzell <<A href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com"
target=_blank>wetzelld@gmail.com</A>><BR>Cc: EM <<A
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
target=_blank>election-methods@lists.electorama.com</A>><BR>Date: Fri,
17 Feb 2012 09:26:33 -0600<BR>Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list
PR, could context matter?<BR></DIV>
<DIV class=gmail_quote>
<BLOCKQUOTE
style="BORDER-LEFT: #ccc 1px solid; MARGIN: 0px 0px 0px 0.8ex; PADDING-LEFT: 1ex"
class=gmail_quote>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV class=im>
<DIV>It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between
ranked choices or party-list PR. </DIV></DIV></BLOCKQUOTE>
<DIV><BR></DIV>
<DIV class=im>
<DIV>I don't. I think that party-list removes voter freedom, and
ranked choices is too much of a burden on the voter. While either
would be better than what we have, I prefer to use delegation a la
SODA. </DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV></DIV>
<DIV class=im>
<DIV>Thus my favored system is <A
href="http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation"
target=_blank>PAL representation</A>. It's true that PAL still has
some (very attenuated) party-list-like aspects, because party
affiliation is used to match candidates to districts at the end; but
if you were willing to give up this (overlapping) geographical
representation aspect of PAL, you could make a similar delegated PR
system in which parties played no explicit role.</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV></DIV>
<DIV>Jameson</DIV>
<DIV><BR></DIV></DIV>
<DIV class=im><BR><BR>---------- Forwarded message
----------<BR>From: "James Gilmour" <<A
href="mailto:jgilmour@globalnet.co.uk"
target=_blank>jgilmour@globalnet.co.uk</A>><BR>To: "'David L
Wetzell'" <<A href="mailto:wetzelld@gmail.com"
target=_blank>wetzelld@gmail.com</A>>, "'EM'" <<A
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
target=_blank>election-methods@lists.electorama.com</A>><BR>Cc: <BR>Date: Fri,
17 Feb 2012 18:01:55 -0000<BR>Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list
PR, could context matter?<BR></DIV>
<DIV>
<DIV class=h5>But why would you want all these differences and
complications?<BR><BR>If you are going to use STV-PR for some of these
elections, why not use STV-PR for all of these elections to the
various<BR>"representative assemblies" (councils, state legislatures,
US House of Representatives, US Senate). STV-PR works OK in
both<BR>partisan and non-partisan elections, so it should give fair
and proper representation of the VOTERS in all these
different<BR>elections.<BR><BR>Of course, with districts returning
only 3 to 5 members, the proportionality and direct representation MAY
be a little limited, but<BR>if small numbers are needed to make the
system acceptable to the vested interests, then so be it. STV-PR
with 3, 4 or 5 member<BR>districts is greatly to be preferred to
plurality in single-member districts and to plurality at large.
We had to accept local<BR>government wards electing only 3 or 4
councillors as part of our STV-PR package - that's
practical politics. But that reform has<BR>transformed our local
government - no more "one-party states".<BR><BR>James
Gilmour<BR><BR><BR>> -----Original Message-----<BR>> From: <A
href="mailto:election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com"
target=_blank>election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com</A><BR>>
[mailto:<A href="mailto:election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com"
target=_blank>election-methods-bounces@lists.electorama.com</A>]
On<BR>> Behalf Of David L Wetzell<BR>> Sent: Friday, February
17, 2012 2:49 PM<BR>> To: EM<BR>> Subject: [EM] STV vs
Party-list PR, could context matter?<BR>><BR>><BR>> It seems
to me that a common sense solution would be to base<BR>> which gets
used on the propensity for voters to be informed<BR>> about the
elections.<BR>><BR>> Also, the two types seem to be bundled with
different types<BR>> of quotas. STV gets marketed with the
droop quota here in<BR>> the US. I'm not complaining because
it's good to simplify<BR>> things. But if STV were bundled
with Droop then 3-seat LR<BR>> Hare might prove handy to make sure
that 3rd parties get a<BR>> constructive role to play in US
politics.<BR>><BR>> So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop
quota, perhaps<BR>> using AV in a first step to simplify and
shorten the<BR>> vote-counting and transferring process, for US
congressional<BR>> elections or city council elections and 3-seat
LR Hare for<BR>> state representative and aldermen elections.
The latter two<BR>> elections are less important and get less
media coverage and<BR>> voter attention. Is it reasonable to
expect voters to rank<BR>> multiple candidates in an election where
they often simply<BR>> vote their party line? Why not keep it
simple and use the<BR>> mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep
the system's<BR>> duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly
contested?<BR>><BR>> It seems to me that most folks think the
choice is between<BR>> ranked choices or party-list PR. I
think it is a matter of<BR>> context and that both can be useful,
especially when no<BR>> explicit party-list is required for a
3-seat LR Hare<BR>> election. The vice-candidates who would
hold the extra seats<BR>> a party wins could either be selected
after the victory or<BR>> specified before hand.<BR>><BR>> So
what do you think?<BR>><BR>> I'm keeping the seat numbers down
because I accept that those<BR>> in power aren't going to want an
EU multi-party system and<BR>> I'm not sure they're wrong about
that, plus the US is used to<BR>> voting the candidate and having
their representative and they<BR>> could keep that if there are
relatively few seats per election.<BR>><BR>>
dlw<BR>><BR><BR><BR><BR><BR></DIV></DIV>---------- Forwarded
message ----------<BR>From: "Markus Schulze" <<A
href="mailto:Markus.Schulze@alumni.TU-Berlin.DE"
target=_blank>Markus.Schulze@alumni.TU-Berlin.DE</A>><BR>To: <A
href="mailto:election-methods@lists.electorama.com"
target=_blank>election-methods@lists.electorama.com</A><BR>Cc: <BR>Date: Fri,
17 Feb 2012 19:27:05 +0100<BR>Subject: Re: [EM] Question about
Schulze beatpath method<BR>Hallo,<BR><BR>it can happen that the
weakest link in the strongest path<BR>from candidate A to candidate B
and the weakest link in the<BR>strongest path from candidate B to
candidate A is the same link,<BR>say CD.<BR><BR>I recommend that, in
this case, the link CD should be declared<BR>"forbidden" and the
strongest path from candidate A to candidate B<BR>and the strongest
path from candidate B to candidate A, that does<BR>not contain a
"forbidden" link, should be calculated. If again the<BR>weakest link
in the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B<BR>and the
weakest link in the strongest path from candidate B to<BR>candidate A
is the same link (say EF), then also this link should<BR>be declared
"forbidden" and the paths from A to B and from B to A<BR>should be
calculated. This should be repeated until the weakest<BR>link in the
strongest path from A to B and the weakest link in the<BR>strongest
path from B to A are different links.<BR><BR>Markus
Schulze<BR><BR><BR><BR>_______________________________________________<BR>Election-Methods
mailing list<BR><A href="mailto:Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com"
target=_blank>Election-Methods@lists.electorama.com</A><BR><A
href="http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com"
target=_blank>http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com</A><BR><BR></BLOCKQUOTE></DIV><BR></DIV><BR>----<BR>Election-Methods
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