[EM] JQ wrt SODA

Fri Feb 17 12:35:58 PST 2012

If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with
plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true.

Jameson

2012/2/17 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>

> IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to
> convince someone like Soros to help you market it.  It wouldn't matter if
> you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory.
>
> But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many
> serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over
> IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more
> significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight
> modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first
> stage.
>
> dlw
>
> On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, <
> election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:
>
>> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
>>        election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>>
>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>>
>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>
>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>>        election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com
>>
>> You can reach the person managing the list at
>>        election-methods-owner at lists.electorama.com
>>
>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
>> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
>>
>> Today's Topics:
>>
>>   1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma?
>>      (Kristofer Munsterhjelm)
>>   2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell)
>>   3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn)
>>   4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn)
>>   5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour)
>>   6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze)
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>
>> To: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>> Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma?
>> On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>>
>>> As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken
>>> dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma.
>>> Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either
>>> plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would
>>> have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two
>>> "vote splitting" factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred
>>> each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood
>>> and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to
>>> cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000
>>> doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not
>>> have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the
>>> most self-consistent counts of Florida.
>>>
>>
>> Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was
>> used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property
>> would remain in a singlewinner context.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>> Cc:
>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600
>> Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
>> It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets
>> used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections.
>>
>> Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas.
>>  STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US.  I'm not
>> complaining because it's good to simplify things.  But if STV were bundled
>> with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd
>> parties get a constructive role to play in US politics.
>>
>> So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a
>> first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring
>> process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and
>> 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections.  The latter
>> two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter
>> attention.  Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates
>> in an election where they often simply vote their party line?  Why not keep
>> it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the
>> system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested?
>>
>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices
>> or party-list PR.  I think it is a matter of context and that both can be
>> useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR
>> Hare election.  The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats a party
>> wins could either be selected after the victory or specified before hand.
>>
>> So what do you think?
>>
>> I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those in power
>> aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and I'm not sure they're
>> wrong about that, plus the US is used to voting the candidate and having
>> their representative and they could keep that if there are relatively few
>> seats per election.
>>
>> dlw
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>,
>> electionsciencefoundation <electionscience at googlegroups.com>
>> Cc:
>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:20:20 -0600
>> Subject: [EM] SODA arguments
>> For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all measure
>> of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters will
>> beat all other systems, including Range/Approval.
>>
>> For those who feel that Condorcet compliance is the be-all-and-end-all, a
>> majority Condorcet winner, or any Condorcet winner with 3 candidates and
>> full candidate preferences, is not just the winner with honest votes, but
>> in all cases the strategically-forced winner; this contrasts with Condorcet
>> systems, in which strategy can cause even majority- or 3-candidate- CWs to
>> lose.
>>
>> For those who feel that strategic resistance is the most important, SODA
>> is unmatched. It meets FBC, solves the chicken dilemma, has no burial
>> incentive (ie, meets later-no-help), and even meets later-no-harm for the
>> two most-approved candidates (where it matters most). It's monotonic, and I
>> believe (haven't proven) that it meets consistency. It meets participation,
>> cloneproofness, and IIA for up to 4 candidates.
>>
>> For those "middlebrows" who most value a system's acceptability to
>> current incumbents, SODA is top-of-the-line. It allows voters to vote
>> plurality-style and, if two parties are clearly favored by voters, allows
>> those two parties to prevent a weak centrist from winning, even if
>> polarization is so high that the centrist is an apparent Condorcet winner.
>>
>> For those who want simplicity: while it's true that the SODA counting
>> process is more complicated than approval, the process of voting is
>> actually simpler than any other system, because you can just vote for your
>> favorite candidate. For the majority who agrees with their favorite
>> candidate's preferences, there is no strategic need to watch the polls and
>> figure out who the frontrunners are, and no nail-biting dilemma of whether
>> to rank others as equal to your favorite.
>>
>> And for those who balk at delegation, SODA allows any voter to cast a
>> direct, undelegated ballot; and allows those voters who do delegate to know
>> how their vote will be used. Refusing to consider SODA because you don't
>> want to delegate, is like refusing to walk into a candy store because you
>> don't like chocolate; SODA allows, not requires, delegation.
>>
>> I think pretty much everybody on this list falls into one or more of the
>> above categories. So, what's not to like about SODA?
>>
>> Jameson
>>
>> ps. I clarified the SODA procedure<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA_voting_(Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval)#Full.2C_step-by-step_rules> on
>> the wiki, though there were no substantive changes. I improved the
>> formatting, marked the steps which are optional, and better explained that
>> winning candidates use their delegated votes first because precisely
>> because they will probably choose not to approve others.
>>
>> Comments are welcome.
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
>> To: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>> Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:26:33 -0600
>> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
>>
>>>
>>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked
>>> choices or party-list PR.
>>>
>>
>> I don't. I think that party-list removes voter freedom, and ranked
>> choices is too much of a burden on the voter. While either would be better
>> than what we have, I prefer to use delegation a la SODA.
>>
>> Thus my favored system is PAL representation<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation>.
>> It's true that PAL still has some (very attenuated) party-list-like
>> aspects, because party affiliation is used to match candidates to districts
>> at the end; but if you were willing to give up this (overlapping)
>> geographical representation aspect of PAL, you could make a similar
>> delegated PR system in which parties played no explicit role.
>>
>> Jameson
>>
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: "James Gilmour" <jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk>
>> To: "'David L Wetzell'" <wetzelld at gmail.com>, "'EM'" <
>> election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
>> Cc:
>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 18:01:55 -0000
>> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
>> But why would you want all these differences and complications?
>>
>> If you are going to use STV-PR for some of these elections, why not use
>> STV-PR for all of these elections to the various
>> "representative assemblies" (councils, state legislatures, US House of
>> Representatives, US Senate).  STV-PR works OK in both
>> partisan and non-partisan elections, so it should give fair and proper
>> representation of the VOTERS in all these different
>> elections.
>>
>> Of course, with districts returning only 3 to 5 members, the
>> proportionality and direct representation MAY be a little limited, but
>> if small numbers are needed to make the system acceptable to the vested
>> interests, then so be it.  STV-PR with 3, 4 or 5 member
>> districts is greatly to be preferred to plurality in single-member
>> districts and to plurality at large.  We had to accept local
>> government wards electing only 3 or 4 councillors as part of our STV-PR
>> package  -  that's practical politics.  But that reform has
>> transformed our local government  -  no more "one-party states".
>>
>> James Gilmour
>>
>>
>> > -----Original Message-----
>> > From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
>> > [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On
>> > Behalf Of David L Wetzell
>> > Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 2:49 PM
>> > To: EM
>> > Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
>> >
>> >
>> > It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base
>> > which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed
>> > about the elections.
>> >
>> > Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types
>> > of quotas.  STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in
>> > the US.  I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify
>> > things.  But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR
>> > Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a
>> > constructive role to play in US politics.
>> >
>> > So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps
>> > using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the
>> > vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional
>> > elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for
>> > state representative and aldermen elections.  The latter two
>> > elections are less important and get less media coverage and
>> > voter attention.  Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank
>> > multiple candidates in an election where they often simply
>> > vote their party line?  Why not keep it simple and use the
>> > mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's
>> > duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested?
>> >
>> > It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between
>> > ranked choices or party-list PR.  I think it is a matter of
>> > context and that both can be useful, especially when no
>> > explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare
>> > election.  The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats
>> > a party wins could either be selected after the victory or
>> > specified before hand.
>> >
>> > So what do you think?
>> >
>> > I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those
>> > in power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and
>> > I'm not sure they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to
>> > voting the candidate and having their representative and they
>> > could keep that if there are relatively few seats per election.
>> >
>> > dlw
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From: "Markus Schulze" <Markus.Schulze at alumni.TU-Berlin.DE>
>> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
>> Cc:
>> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 19:27:05 +0100
>> Subject: Re: [EM] Question about Schulze beatpath method
>> Hallo,
>>
>> it can happen that the weakest link in the strongest path
>> from candidate A to candidate B and the weakest link in the
>> strongest path from candidate B to candidate A is the same link,
>> say CD.
>>
>> I recommend that, in this case, the link CD should be declared
>> "forbidden" and the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B
>> and the strongest path from candidate B to candidate A, that does
>> not contain a "forbidden" link, should be calculated. If again the
>> weakest link in the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B
>> and the weakest link in the strongest path from candidate B to
>> candidate A is the same link (say EF), then also this link should
>> be declared "forbidden" and the paths from A to B and from B to A
>> should be calculated. This should be repeated until the weakest
>> link in the strongest path from A to B and the weakest link in the
>> strongest path from B to A are different links.
>>
>> Markus Schulze
>>
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Election-Methods mailing list
>> Election-Methods at lists.electorama.com
>> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
>>
>>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20120217/745872b0/attachment-0004.htm>