[EM] JQ wrt SODA

[David L Wetzell]

IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to
convince someone like Soros to help you market it.  It wouldn't matter if
you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory.

But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many
serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over
IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more
significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight
modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first
stage.

dlw

On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, <
election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com> wrote:

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> Today's Topics:
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>   1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma?
>      (Kristofer Munsterhjelm)
>   2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell)
>   3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn)
>   4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn)
>   5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour)
>   6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze)
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>
> To: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100
> Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma?
> On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
>> As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken
>> dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma.
>> Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either
>> plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would
>> have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two
>> "vote splitting" factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred
>> each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood
>> and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to
>> cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000
>> doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not
>> have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the
>> most self-consistent counts of Florida.
>>
>
> Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was used
> to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property would
> remain in a singlewinner context.
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600
> Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
> It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets
> used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections.
>
> Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas.
>  STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US.  I'm not
> complaining because it's good to simplify things.  But if STV were bundled
> with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd
> parties get a constructive role to play in US politics.
>
> So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a
> first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring
> process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and
> 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections.  The latter
> two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter
> attention.  Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates
> in an election where they often simply vote their party line?  Why not keep
> it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the
> system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested?
>
> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices
> or party-list PR.  I think it is a matter of context and that both can be
> useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR
> Hare election.  The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats a party
> wins could either be selected after the victory or specified before hand.
>
> So what do you think?
>
> I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those in power
> aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and I'm not sure they're
> wrong about that, plus the US is used to voting the candidate and having
> their representative and they could keep that if there are relatively few
> seats per election.
>
> dlw
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> To: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>, electionsciencefoundation
> <electionscience at googlegroups.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:20:20 -0600
> Subject: [EM] SODA arguments
> For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all measure
> of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters will
> beat all other systems, including Range/Approval.
>
> For those who feel that Condorcet compliance is the be-all-and-end-all, a
> majority Condorcet winner, or any Condorcet winner with 3 candidates and
> full candidate preferences, is not just the winner with honest votes, but
> in all cases the strategically-forced winner; this contrasts with Condorcet
> systems, in which strategy can cause even majority- or 3-candidate- CWs to
> lose.
>
> For those who feel that strategic resistance is the most important, SODA
> is unmatched. It meets FBC, solves the chicken dilemma, has no burial
> incentive (ie, meets later-no-help), and even meets later-no-harm for the
> two most-approved candidates (where it matters most). It's monotonic, and I
> believe (haven't proven) that it meets consistency. It meets participation,
> cloneproofness, and IIA for up to 4 candidates.
>
> For those "middlebrows" who most value a system's acceptability to current
> incumbents, SODA is top-of-the-line. It allows voters to vote
> plurality-style and, if two parties are clearly favored by voters, allows
> those two parties to prevent a weak centrist from winning, even if
> polarization is so high that the centrist is an apparent Condorcet winner.
>
> For those who want simplicity: while it's true that the SODA counting
> process is more complicated than approval, the process of voting is
> actually simpler than any other system, because you can just vote for your
> favorite candidate. For the majority who agrees with their favorite
> candidate's preferences, there is no strategic need to watch the polls and
> figure out who the frontrunners are, and no nail-biting dilemma of whether
> to rank others as equal to your favorite.
>
> And for those who balk at delegation, SODA allows any voter to cast a
> direct, undelegated ballot; and allows those voters who do delegate to know
> how their vote will be used. Refusing to consider SODA because you don't
> want to delegate, is like refusing to walk into a candy store because you
> don't like chocolate; SODA allows, not requires, delegation.
>
> I think pretty much everybody on this list falls into one or more of the
> above categories. So, what's not to like about SODA?
>
> Jameson
>
> ps. I clarified the SODA procedure<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA_voting_(Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval)#Full.2C_step-by-step_rules> on
> the wiki, though there were no substantive changes. I improved the
> formatting, marked the steps which are optional, and better explained that
> winning candidates use their delegated votes first because precisely
> because they will probably choose not to approve others.
>
> Comments are welcome.
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
> To: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
> Cc: EM <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 09:26:33 -0600
> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
>
>>
>> It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices
>> or party-list PR.
>>
>
> I don't. I think that party-list removes voter freedom, and ranked choices
> is too much of a burden on the voter. While either would be better than
> what we have, I prefer to use delegation a la SODA.
>
> Thus my favored system is PAL representation<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation>.
> It's true that PAL still has some (very attenuated) party-list-like
> aspects, because party affiliation is used to match candidates to districts
> at the end; but if you were willing to give up this (overlapping)
> geographical representation aspect of PAL, you could make a similar
> delegated PR system in which parties played no explicit role.
>
> Jameson
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: "James Gilmour" <jgilmour at globalnet.co.uk>
> To: "'David L Wetzell'" <wetzelld at gmail.com>, "'EM'" <
> election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 18:01:55 -0000
> Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
> But why would you want all these differences and complications?
>
> If you are going to use STV-PR for some of these elections, why not use
> STV-PR for all of these elections to the various
> "representative assemblies" (councils, state legislatures, US House of
> Representatives, US Senate).  STV-PR works OK in both
> partisan and non-partisan elections, so it should give fair and proper
> representation of the VOTERS in all these different
> elections.
>
> Of course, with districts returning only 3 to 5 members, the
> proportionality and direct representation MAY be a little limited, but
> if small numbers are needed to make the system acceptable to the vested
> interests, then so be it.  STV-PR with 3, 4 or 5 member
> districts is greatly to be preferred to plurality in single-member
> districts and to plurality at large.  We had to accept local
> government wards electing only 3 or 4 councillors as part of our STV-PR
> package  -  that's practical politics.  But that reform has
> transformed our local government  -  no more "one-party states".
>
> James Gilmour
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
> > [mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On
> > Behalf Of David L Wetzell
> > Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 2:49 PM
> > To: EM
> > Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
> >
> >
> > It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base
> > which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed
> > about the elections.
> >
> > Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types
> > of quotas.  STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in
> > the US.  I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify
> > things.  But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR
> > Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a
> > constructive role to play in US politics.
> >
> > So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps
> > using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the
> > vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional
> > elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for
> > state representative and aldermen elections.  The latter two
> > elections are less important and get less media coverage and
> > voter attention.  Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank
> > multiple candidates in an election where they often simply
> > vote their party line?  Why not keep it simple and use the
> > mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's
> > duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested?
> >
> > It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between
> > ranked choices or party-list PR.  I think it is a matter of
> > context and that both can be useful, especially when no
> > explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare
> > election.  The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats
> > a party wins could either be selected after the victory or
> > specified before hand.
> >
> > So what do you think?
> >
> > I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those
> > in power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and
> > I'm not sure they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to
> > voting the candidate and having their representative and they
> > could keep that if there are relatively few seats per election.
> >
> > dlw
> >
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: "Markus Schulze" <Markus.Schulze at alumni.TU-Berlin.DE>
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Cc:
> Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 19:27:05 +0100
> Subject: Re: [EM] Question about Schulze beatpath method
> Hallo,
>
> it can happen that the weakest link in the strongest path
> from candidate A to candidate B and the weakest link in the
> strongest path from candidate B to candidate A is the same link,
> say CD.
>
> I recommend that, in this case, the link CD should be declared
> "forbidden" and the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B
> and the strongest path from candidate B to candidate A, that does
> not contain a "forbidden" link, should be calculated. If again the
> weakest link in the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B
> and the weakest link in the strongest path from candidate B to
> candidate A is the same link (say EF), then also this link should
> be declared "forbidden" and the paths from A to B and from B to A
> should be calculated. This should be repeated until the weakest
> link in the strongest path from A to B and the weakest link in the
> strongest path from B to A are different links.
>
> Markus Schulze
>
>
>
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