[EM] Majority-Judgement. Condorcet.

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/2/2 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>

>
> MJ:
>
> Thanks for all the answers about MJ strategy.
>
> But I'd told how easily a strategic faction can take advantage of and beat
> a sincere-voting faction.
>

Not to my satisfaction.


>
> And, if the contest is close, then even a small difference in sincerity
> could decide which faction's candidate wins.
>
> And that amounts to a co-operatioin/defection problem too.
>
> No amount of speculation or discussion of MJ's other strategy issues or
> mystique will make that go away.
>
> Thanks, Kristofer, for confirming my conjecture: MJ strategy is like RV
> strategy.
>
> This is for sure: In a u/a election, MJ's strategy is the same as that of
> RV: Max-rate the acceptables and
> min-rate the unacceptables.
>

This is not true. If sending a message about the relative value within
either group is worth more than a thousand times less than winning the
election, the rational strategy is to use the top two and the bottom two
ratings.


>
> I conjecture that, in a non-u/a, 0-info election, MJ's strategy is
> likewise identical to that of RV: Max-rate the
> above-mean candidates and min-rate the below-mean candidates.
>

As above.


>
> I further conjecture that all MJ strategy, u/a and non-u/a, 0-info and not
> 0-info, is the same as that of RV:
>

As above.


> Max-rate all of the candidates whose merit, for you, is above your
> expectation for the election. Min-rate all of
> the candidates whose merit, for you, is below your expectation for the
> election.
>
> Of course many Approval strategies have been discussed at EM, but they all
> are instances, special cases, of the
> above-stated better-than-expectation strategy.
>
> Condorcet:
>
> Condorcet is almost fine if you don't care about FBC or the
> co-operation/defection problem.
>
> I've already told why I consider FBC and CD to be important. There's no
> need to repeat that now.
>
> I've been saying that, when advocating a criterion, one should say why one
> considers it important. I've amply done
> that, regarding FBC and CD.
>
> So, if you advocate Condorcet, it's because we agree to disagree about FBC
> and CD.
>
> Above, I said "almost fine". That's because, even aside from FBC and CD,
> Condorcet doesn't work as well as I'd
> formerly believed. My claims about Condorcet's powerful thwarting and
> deterence of burial strategy were all based on
> 3-candidate examples.
>
> Just as we all have been in denial about the co-operation/defection
> problem, maybe I and some others hadn't wanted
> to look at what can happen when there are more than 3 candidates in
> Condorcet.
>
> Condorcet's thwarting and deterence of burial, it seems to me, doesn't
> work nearly as well when there are more
> than 3 candidates. That means that SFC doesn't mean as much. SFC was
> central to my advocacy of Condorcet.
>
> So, for all of those reasons, I don't consider Condorcet, in any of its
> versions, to be a good proposal for single-winner reform.
>
> In addition to Approval's FBC compliance, and the fact that CD compliance
> can easily be added via the conditional
> options, Approval is the answer to the question "There are so many voting
> system proposals--Why should we choose
> yours?".
>
> Approval's answer is:
>
> "Because Approval is the minimal, obvious, natural, easily-implemented,
> improvement-change from Plurality. Plurality done right. Approval
> transparently eliminates Plurality's worst problem, without adding one."
>
> And then, with the conditionality-options added, perhaps in a later
> proposal, the method will have un-equalled
> freedom from strategy problems, unmatched mild strategy.
>
> Could it be that the simplest and most obvious and natural is the also
> best, in terms of getting rid of strategy problems?
>
> Yes.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
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>
>
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