<br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/2/2 MIKE OSSIPOFF <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:nkklrp@hotmail.com">nkklrp@hotmail.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<br>MJ:<br><br>Thanks for all the answers about MJ strategy.<br><br>But I'd told how easily a strategic faction can take advantage of and beat a sincere-voting faction.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>
Not to my satisfaction.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div dir="ltr"><br>And, if the contest is close, then even a small difference in sincerity could decide which faction's candidate wins.<br>
<br>And that amounts to a co-operatioin/defection problem too.<br><br>No amount of speculation or discussion of MJ's other strategy issues or mystique will make that go away.<br><br>Thanks, Kristofer, for confirming my conjecture: MJ strategy is like RV strategy.<br>
<br>This is for sure: In a u/a election, MJ's strategy is the same as that of RV: Max-rate the acceptables and<br>min-rate the unacceptables.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>This is not true. If sending a message about the relative value within either group is worth more than a thousand times less than winning the election, the rational strategy is to use the top two and the bottom two ratings.</div>
<div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div dir="ltr"><br>I conjecture that, in a non-u/a, 0-info election, MJ's strategy is likewise identical to that of RV: Max-rate the<br>
above-mean candidates and min-rate the below-mean candidates.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>As above.</div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><div dir="ltr"><br>I further conjecture that all MJ strategy, u/a and non-u/a, 0-info and not 0-info, is the same as that of RV:<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>As above. </div><div> </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><div dir="ltr">Max-rate all of the candidates whose merit, for you, is above your expectation for the election. Min-rate all of <br>the candidates whose merit, for you, is below your expectation for the election.<br>
<br>Of course many Approval strategies have been discussed at EM, but they all are instances, special cases, of the<br>above-stated better-than-expectation strategy.<br><br>Condorcet:<br><br>Condorcet is almost fine if you don't care about FBC or the co-operation/defection problem.<br>
<br>I've already told why I consider FBC and CD to be important. There's no need to repeat that now.<br><br>I've been saying that, when advocating a criterion, one should say why one considers it important. I've amply done<br>
that, regarding FBC and CD.<br><br>So, if you advocate Condorcet, it's because we agree to disagree about FBC and CD.<br><br>Above, I said "almost fine". That's because, even aside from FBC and CD, Condorcet doesn't work as well as I'd <br>
formerly believed. My claims about Condorcet's powerful thwarting and deterence of burial strategy were all based on<br>3-candidate examples.<br><br>Just as we all have been in denial about the co-operation/defection problem, maybe I and some others hadn't wanted<br>
to look at what can happen when there are more than 3 candidates in Condorcet.<br><br>Condorcet's thwarting and deterence of burial, it seems to me, doesn't work nearly as well when there are more<br>than 3 candidates. That means that SFC doesn't mean as much. SFC was central to my advocacy of Condorcet.<br>
<br>So, for all of those reasons, I don't consider Condorcet, in any of its versions, to be a good proposal for single-winner reform.<br><br>In addition to Approval's FBC compliance, and the fact that CD compliance can easily be added via the conditional<br>
options, Approval is the answer to the question "There are so many voting system proposals--Why should we choose<br>yours?". <br><br>Approval's answer is:<br><br>"Because Approval is the minimal, obvious, natural, easily-implemented, improvement-change from Plurality. Plurality done right. Approval<br>
transparently eliminates Plurality's worst problem, without adding one."<br><br>And then, with the conditionality-options added, perhaps in a later proposal, the method will have un-equalled<br>freedom from strategy problems, unmatched mild strategy.<br>
<br>Could it be that the simplest and most obvious and natural is the also best, in terms of getting rid of strategy problems? <br><br>Yes.<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br><br> </font></span></div>
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