[EM] Symmetrical ICT program, with errors fixed

[Michael Ossipoff]

Janeson--

We're using different notation, but, below, I'll clarify the difference.

On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:21 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> 2012/8/24 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>
>> I've printed the program out, and now I feel that I've probably found
>> and corrected all of its errors.
>>
>> This pseudocode is for counting Symmetrical ICT, a rank-count which, I
>> claim, avoids the strategy problems otherwise distort voters sincere
>> expression of preferences--does so better than any other rank-count.
>>
>> It meets FBC; is defection-resistant (meaning that it avoids the
>> Chicken Dilemma);
>
>

Regarding your text below, I just us A to stand for the number of A voters, etc.

> In what sense does it avoid the chicken dilemma?

I'll answer that question after I answer your more specific questions below:

> If there are A(>B>C),
> B(>A>C), and C(>A=B) voters; and n(A)+n(B) > n(C) but n(C) > n(A) and n(C) >
> n(B); and it is not known whether n(A) > n(B); then how should an A voter
> vote so as to ensure that:
>
> ➊ If n(A) > n(B), then there is no strategy for the B voters to elect B

The A voters should vote A>B.

If the B voters defected by not ranking A, they'd thereby succeed only
in electing C. But they'd know that, and therefore they wouldn't
defect, and so it's safe for the A voters to vote A>B.

> ➋ If B voters vote in the symmetrically similar manner, and n(B) > n(A),
> then C is not elected.

The A voters should vote A>B.

Here's why ICT and Symmetrical ICT are defection-resistant:

If there isn't exactly one candidate who is unbeaten, then ICT and
Symmetrical ICT choose the winner based on top-count.

If A beats B, then B isn't unbeaten. If the B voters defect and let C
beat A, then A isn't unbeaten. C isn't unbeaten, because the A and B
voters all vote B over C.

So, defection by the B voters results in everyone beaten, instead of A
being the one unbeaten candidate.

But, because, then, ICT only looks at top-count, that means that you,
as an A voter, have completely withdrawn your support for B. The B
voters defected, and then found that your support for B is gone. That
penalizes and deters defection.

Additionally, ICT and Symmetrical ICT deal well with offensive burial
too, because you can't gain by it unless your favorite is the most
favorite candidate.

Mike Ossipoff