[EM] Mike: read my original post and the follow-on that gave a few concrete examples

Paul Kislanko jpkislanko at bellsouth.net
Mon Apr 30 14:33:01 PDT 2012


I said:

"There are actually two aspects to verification: 1) were all votes cast
COUNTED (this has been a big problem in my precinct in Mississippi) and 2)
was the counting done correctly."

And later

"I guess there's a third angle to verifiability, namely that a vote was
counted under my voter ID should match my ballot.  This is actually the most
important to me as a voter. If a vote were "counted" under my voter ID I
need a way to see that what was counted was the same as the record I got
when I voted. I should be able to compare the "counted" ballot to the one I
submitted."

 

So, in order, and to be very specific, my concerns are

 

1)      Was my vote counted? (Think of  the news stories about unlocked
ballot boxes being found in a landfill.)

2)    Was "my vote" that was counted the same as what I voted (Think of the
problems robert bristow-johnson pointed out)

3)    Do the vote-counters know how to count?

 

My point is hand-countability is the the least of my "verifiability"
concerns. You argue we should only use paper ballots to make your
hand-counting easier, to which I would say we should only use electronic
ballots that won't end up in a landfill or be changed by the primary
hand-counter before you get to "verify" them.

 

I'm just saying if your only "verification" is a hand-counting of ballots to
just confirm that the election officials know how to count, I'm not
impressed.

 

From: election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-bounces at lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of Michael
Ossipoff

 

Paul:

 

You said:

 

Which still begs the more important question. My point was that
hand-counting ONLY verifies the accuracy of the original count. It does not
address the (more important) questions of whether my ballot was counted as I
intended either time.

 

[endquote]

 

If count accuracy is verified, then the matter if your ballot was counted as
you intended

depends on whether you want your ballot counted accurately, or inaccurately.

 

If you want it counted accurately, and if accuracy is verified, then your
ballot was indeed

counted as you intended.

 

Or are we still back at your concern that the machine might prilnt out
something different from

what you voted on the touchscreen? I'll repeat for the 5th or 6th time that
you should always

check your printed ballot, to make sure that it is what you intend, before
depositing it in the

slot in the ballot-box.

 

You continued:

 

Even if you alter every vote-collecting method to match something suitable
for a hand-count, all you've done is verify the count.

 

[endquote]

 

You aren't being at all clear about what you're talking about. Veriflyng the
count is good

enough, one would expect. Of course it's necessary to also ensure that the
ballots being

counted are genuine. Is that what you mean?

 

Yes: If the handcount were done by governement-appointed Republicans, in a
closed room, after which

the ballots were destroyed, then a handcount would be just like our current
machine-counts.

 

But handcounts aren't done like that, are they. They're done openly,
observed by all.

 

Have representatives of all parts of the political spectrum up close to
observe the count in person. 

 

Have video-cameras recording the entire count, and looking at every
ballot-stack and ballot-box and

counting station, and all of the count personnel, from all angles, wide
angle and close-up.

 

Representatives of all parts of the political spectrum should accompany the
ballots to their storage

room, which would have several locks, each of which can be opened by only
one of those representatives.

The inside of the room, and the door to it should be well-covered by several
video cameras, preferably

owned and operated by those representatives, and un-tamperable.

 

If you can get degree of count-fraud security with a machine-count, then I
congratulate you. Then I'd have

no objection to a machine-count. You said something about public-key
encription possibly playing a role,

and that would be great, if it could help to achieve reliable security in a
machine coulnt.

 

You continue:

 

Fraud or mistakes do
not typically come from counting errors.

 

[endquote]

 

But how would you Paul know that, when the count result is

unverified?

 

Look at articles after the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, such as the
Harpers magazine

article soon after the 2004 count, and then tell me that count fraud isn't a
problem. 

 

Must go now. This reply to be continued...

 

Mike Ossipoff



 



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