[EM] Dave, IRV, 4/20/12

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Fri Apr 20 14:30:51 PDT 2012

You said:

I choke when I see IRV called "fine"


Have I ever said that, without qualifying it? No.

I've said that IRV would be fine with an electorate different from
the one tht we now have--an electorate completely free of inclination
to overcompromise, so that even IRV's flagrant FBC failure wouldn't
induce them to overcompromise.

I've said that IRV would be fine for me, as a voter.

I'm not one of those who is inclined to overcompromise for a lesser-evil.

Its MMC compliance and defection-proofness would work fine for me.

You continued:

 - it too easily ignores parts of
what the voters say.  For example, look at what can happen with A
being much liked, yet IRV not always noticing:

20 A
20 B>A
22 C>A
Joe ?

Condorcet would see A elected by 62 votes (plus, perhaps, Joe's


It would help to specify more about Joe. Examples with a voter whose preferences
and vote are unknown are difficult to comment on.

A and B voters are a majority, but not a mutual majority. the A voters
are indifferent
between B and C. So, maybe you're pointing out that for {A,B} to win
or not win, it depends on
which one gets eliminated first. True. Not ideal, I agree, but the B
voters want the coalition
and the A voters don't. So whether there's a coalition will depend on
which one gets eliminated

And we do know that the A voters are indifferent between B and C,
because IRV gives them
no incentive to defect.

Mike Ossipoff

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