[EM] Explain statement re: Approval enactment feasibility

Michael Ossipoff mikeo2106 at msn.com
Thu Apr 12 14:30:17 PDT 2012


You wrote:

I share your preference for ranked ballots and Condorcet methods.  Yet I 
also realize that, as does Jameson, that Approval voting will not get 
used for U.S. Presidential general elections


For what reason to you believe that Approval isn't enact-able for U.S.
presidential general elections? 

Are you saying that it isn't possible to change the voting system for
presidential general elections? Certainly it would be more difficult than
municipal election-reforms--unless enough people wanted that change at
the national level.

Or are you saying that, for those elections, Approval is less enact-able 
than other methods such as Condorcet or Kemmeny?

If so, then why do you say that?

I've often told why Approval is incomparably more enact-able than the rank 
methods. I explained it in my recent posting entitled "Rank methods, contd.",
just a few postings back from this posting, in the date-ordered postings list.

Approval is the minimal change, the obvious and natural freedom-enhancement, 
of Plurality. Plurality is a points system that only lets you give a point to
one candidate, only lets you rate one candidate. Obviously that rules-forced
lack of information has bad societal consequences, when compromisers can't
good-rate their more favorite candidates. Excluding information without
a good justification can't be a good thing. Obviously voters should be able
to rate all the candidates. Candidate X is acceptable as a compromise, but
Candidates Y and Z are better, and so you can rate all 3 of them as "Approved".

Condorcet's (and probably Kemmeny's) improvement over Approval is illusory:

The Aproval bad-example is:

Sincere rankings:

27: A>B
24: B>A
49: C

In Approval, but also, just as much, in Condorcet, the A voters' support for
B, even in 2nd rank position, will elect B, if the B voters defect by not 
reciprocating that 2nd place support.

In other words, the same problem that Condorcetists complain about in Approval,
is right there in Condorcet too.

The difference is that Condorcet is more elaborately implemented, and incomparably
less enact-able than Approval.

No doubt what I've said about Condorcet applies to Kemmeny too. What does Kemmeny do
with these rankings?:

27: A>B
24: B
49: C

Does it do like Condorcet, and elect B?

Does it meet FBC?

Mike Ossipoff

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