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<pre><br>Richard:<br><br>You wrote:<br><br>I share your preference for ranked ballots and Condorcet methods. Yet I
also realize that, as does Jameson, that Approval voting will not get
used for U.S. Presidential general elections<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>For what reason to you believe that Approval isn't enact-able for U.S.<br>presidential general elections? <br><br>Are you saying that it isn't possible to change the voting system for<br>presidential general elections? Certainly it would be more difficult than<br>municipal election-reforms--unless enough people wanted that change at<br>the national level.<br><br>Or are you saying that, for those elections, Approval is less enact-able <br>than other methods such as Condorcet or Kemmeny?<br><br>If so, then why do you say that?<br><br>I've often told why Approval is incomparably more enact-able than the rank <br>methods. I explained it in my recent posting entitled "Rank methods, contd.",<br>just a few postings back from this posting, in the date-ordered postings list.<br><br>Approval is the minimal change, the obvious and natural freedom-enhancement, <br>of Plurality. Plurality is a points system that only lets you give a point to<br>one candidate, only lets you rate one candidate. Obviously that rules-forced<br>lack of information has bad societal consequences, when compromisers can't<br>good-rate their more favorite candidates. Excluding information without<br>a good justification can't be a good thing. Obviously voters should be able<br>to rate all the candidates. Candidate X is acceptable as a compromise, but<br>Candidates Y and Z are better, and so you can rate all 3 of them as "Approved".<br><br>Condorcet's (and probably Kemmeny's) improvement over Approval is illusory:<br><br>The Aproval bad-example is:<br><br>Sincere rankings:<br><br>27: A>B<br>24: B>A<br>49: C<br><br>In Approval, but also, just as much, in Condorcet, the A voters' support for<br>B, even in 2nd rank position, will elect B, if the B voters defect by not <br>reciprocating that 2nd place support.<br><br>In other words, the same problem that Condorcetists complain about in Approval,<br>is right there in Condorcet too.<br><br>The difference is that Condorcet is more elaborately implemented, and incomparably<br>less enact-able than Approval.<br><br>No doubt what I've said about Condorcet applies to Kemmeny too. What does Kemmeny do<br>with these rankings?:<br><br>27: A>B<br>24: B<br>49: C<br><br>Does it do like Condorcet, and elect B?<br><br>Does it meet FBC?<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br><br><br></pre> </div></body>
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