[EM] Explain statement re: Approval enactment feasibility

[Richard Fobes]

Michael,

The characteristics of each voting method, including Condorcet-Kemeny 
(which Markus Schulze has named "Kemeny-Young" in Wikipedia), are in the 
comparison table in the Wikipedia "Voting system" article:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_system#Compliance_of_selected_systems_.28table.29

Remember that this is a checklist, and does not reveal how often (or how 
rarely, or under what circumstances) a method fails each criteria.

Sorry about the brief reply, but I haven't yet had time to catch up with 
earlier questions from Kristofer and Jameson (which require longer 
replies).  In addition to the Democracy Chronicles article, I'm pursuing 
other voting-related activities (including explaining last night's 
surprise voting result on American Idol), not to mention that 
election-method reform is supposed to be a side project (because I'm not 
in the academic world where I would be getting paid for it).

Richard


On 4/12/2012 2:30 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> Richard:
>
> You wrote:
>
> I share your preference for ranked ballots and Condorcet methods.  Yet I
> also realize that, as does Jameson, that Approval voting will not get
> used for U.S. Presidential general elections
>
> [endquote]
>
> For what reason to you believe that Approval isn't enact-able for U.S.
> presidential general elections?
>
> Are you saying that it isn't possible to change the voting system for
> presidential general elections? Certainly it would be more difficult than
> municipal election-reforms--unless enough people wanted that change at
> the national level.
>
> Or are you saying that, for those elections, Approval is less enact-able
> than other methods such as Condorcet or Kemmeny?
>
> If so, then why do you say that?
>
> I've often told why Approval is incomparably more enact-able than the rank
> methods. I explained it in my recent posting entitled "Rank methods, contd.",
> just a few postings back from this posting, in the date-ordered postings list.
>
> Approval is the minimal change, the obvious and natural freedom-enhancement,
> of Plurality. Plurality is a points system that only lets you give a point to
> one candidate, only lets you rate one candidate. Obviously that rules-forced
> lack of information has bad societal consequences, when compromisers can't
> good-rate their more favorite candidates. Excluding information without
> a good justification can't be a good thing. Obviously voters should be able
> to rate all the candidates. Candidate X is acceptable as a compromise, but
> Candidates Y and Z are better, and so you can rate all 3 of them as "Approved".
>
> Condorcet's (and probably Kemmeny's) improvement over Approval is illusory:
>
> The Aproval bad-example is:
>
> Sincere rankings:
>
> 27: A>B
> 24: B>A
> 49: C
>
> In Approval, but also, just as much, in Condorcet, the A voters' support for
> B, even in 2nd rank position, will elect B, if the B voters defect by not
> reciprocating that 2nd place support.
>
> In other words, the same problem that Condorcetists complain about in Approval,
> is right there in Condorcet too.
>
> The difference is that Condorcet is more elaborately implemented, and incomparably
> less enact-able than Approval.
>
> No doubt what I've said about Condorcet applies to Kemmeny too. What does Kemmeny do
> with these rankings?:
>
> 27: A>B
> 24: B
> 49: C
>
> Does it do like Condorcet, and elect B?
>
> Does it meet FBC?
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
>
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