[EM] Explain statement re: Approval enactment feasibility
ElectionMethods at VoteFair.org
Fri Apr 13 10:46:43 PDT 2012
The characteristics of each voting method, including Condorcet-Kemeny
(which Markus Schulze has named "Kemeny-Young" in Wikipedia), are in the
comparison table in the Wikipedia "Voting system" article:
Remember that this is a checklist, and does not reveal how often (or how
rarely, or under what circumstances) a method fails each criteria.
Sorry about the brief reply, but I haven't yet had time to catch up with
earlier questions from Kristofer and Jameson (which require longer
replies). In addition to the Democracy Chronicles article, I'm pursuing
other voting-related activities (including explaining last night's
surprise voting result on American Idol), not to mention that
election-method reform is supposed to be a side project (because I'm not
in the academic world where I would be getting paid for it).
On 4/12/2012 2:30 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> You wrote:
> I share your preference for ranked ballots and Condorcet methods. Yet I
> also realize that, as does Jameson, that Approval voting will not get
> used for U.S. Presidential general elections
> For what reason to you believe that Approval isn't enact-able for U.S.
> presidential general elections?
> Are you saying that it isn't possible to change the voting system for
> presidential general elections? Certainly it would be more difficult than
> municipal election-reforms--unless enough people wanted that change at
> the national level.
> Or are you saying that, for those elections, Approval is less enact-able
> than other methods such as Condorcet or Kemmeny?
> If so, then why do you say that?
> I've often told why Approval is incomparably more enact-able than the rank
> methods. I explained it in my recent posting entitled "Rank methods, contd.",
> just a few postings back from this posting, in the date-ordered postings list.
> Approval is the minimal change, the obvious and natural freedom-enhancement,
> of Plurality. Plurality is a points system that only lets you give a point to
> one candidate, only lets you rate one candidate. Obviously that rules-forced
> lack of information has bad societal consequences, when compromisers can't
> good-rate their more favorite candidates. Excluding information without
> a good justification can't be a good thing. Obviously voters should be able
> to rate all the candidates. Candidate X is acceptable as a compromise, but
> Candidates Y and Z are better, and so you can rate all 3 of them as "Approved".
> Condorcet's (and probably Kemmeny's) improvement over Approval is illusory:
> The Aproval bad-example is:
> Sincere rankings:
> 27: A>B
> 24: B>A
> 49: C
> In Approval, but also, just as much, in Condorcet, the A voters' support for
> B, even in 2nd rank position, will elect B, if the B voters defect by not
> reciprocating that 2nd place support.
> In other words, the same problem that Condorcetists complain about in Approval,
> is right there in Condorcet too.
> The difference is that Condorcet is more elaborately implemented, and incomparably
> less enact-able than Approval.
> No doubt what I've said about Condorcet applies to Kemmeny too. What does Kemmeny do
> with these rankings?:
> 27: A>B
> 24: B
> 49: C
> Does it do like Condorcet, and elect B?
> Does it meet FBC?
> Mike Ossipoff
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
More information about the Election-Methods