[EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts

[Dave Ketchum]

Thanks to both of you for worthy effort.

On Sep 1, 2011, at 12:38 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:

> OK, this is going to be controversial, but Jameson Quinn and I are  
> attempting to write one advantage for each of the four election  
> methods supported in our Declaration.
>
> Below are the versions each of us have written.  What does everyone  
> else prefer?
>
> We know that the final result will be different from what either of  
> us have written, so please suggest improvements -- either as better  
> wordings or as requests for what to change.
>
> If we cannot agree on this content, we can leave out these  
> paragraphs and let the readers investigate each method without us  
> offering any high-level perspective.

--------------- A voter's view by Dave Ketchum -----------

Mark on a ruler those you would be willing to promote toward winning,  
assuming those that you prefer drop out for some reason (in deciding  
on a value, consider what would be meaningful in the election method  
to be used).  Then consider the four systems of voting that might be  
in place:

* Approval - vote for all that you have marked, perhaps excluding the  
least-liked, for you are giving equal backing to all that you vote for.

* Condorcet system - rank all that you have marked, according to their  
positions on the ruler, noting that this makes high-ranked preferred  
over any lesser.

* Majority Judgment - rate those you would rank for Condorcet.  Also  
rate the least-liked to help vote counters see how you scale strength.

* Range - same as MJ.
>
>
> ------------- version from Jameson Quinn: -------------
>
> Some examples of advantages claimed for each system are:
>
> * Approval is the simplest of the systems, and thus, in places where  
> voters are wary of complexity, may have the best chance of passing.  
> Even at an academic conference on social choice theory, where few  
> argued that Approval was the overall-best system, it still received  
> the widest support. It also is a step towards any of the other  
> systems; any of the systems, if used with an approval ballot, ends  
> up being equivalent to approval. Therefore, after seeing what issues  
> arose under approval, we might be able to make a better-informed  
> choice of which other system to move on to.
>
> * Condorcet systems give the best possible guarantee that the result  
> would be consistent with a two-way race. When there is a “Condorcet  
> winner” --- a single candidate who could beat any other candidate  
> one-on-one --- most people’s sense of fairness and democracy say  
> that such a candidate should win.

"two-way" means?
>
>
> * Majority Judgment allows a score ballot, the most expressive  
> ballot type because it can show the strength of preferences. The  
> advocates of this system claim that it gives relatively little  
> incentive for dishonest, strategic votes. Also, by focusing on the  
> absolute quality of a candidate, rather than their quality relative  
> to other options, it may help avoid a situation where a polarized  
> electorate elects an unqualified compromise candidate just because  
> both sides prefer such a nonentity to seeing the other side win.
>
> * Range also uses the expressive score ballot. This system has been  
> shown in simulations to give the results which best-satisfy the  
> voters. It gives the best results in this sense with any  
> predetermined fractions of honest and strategic voters. It is not  
> known if these simulations accurately reflect real voters, who might  
> use strategy in different amounts under different voting systems or  
> in different factions.
>
> ------------- version from Richard Fobes: -------------
>
> Although we disagree about various characteristics of the four  
> supported methods, most of us agree that:
>
> * Approval voting is the easiest election method in terms of  
> collecting preferences (either on ballots or verbally) and in terms  
> of counting.
>
> * Condorcet methods provide the fairest results in the many cases in  
> which one candidate – the Condorcet winner – is pairwise preferred  
> over every other candidate.

When there is no single winner, the vote counting must decide among  
those best approaching winning.
>
>
> * Majority judgment uses score ballots (which collect the fullest  
> preference information) in a way that reduces the effect of  
> strategic voting.
>
> * Score voting may provide the mathematically defined "best" overall  
> ("optimum") results if voters vote sincerely instead of  
> strategically.	
> 	
> ------------- end -------------
>
> Thanks!
>
> (We are getting close to having the next, and possibly final,  
> version ready to review in full.)
>
> Richard Fobes