[EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts

[Jameson Quinn]

Sorry, I don't have time for a proper response to this right now. I think
the draft that I wrote was not pared down enough yet and I wanted to work on
it some more before it was posted here. And I think that Richard's version
is not quite accurate, though probably just a few words' adjustment will
make it work.

I also think it's important to say that these are the claims of each
method's supporters. You should not have to endorse all of this in order to
sign the statement.

JQ

2011/8/31 Richard Fobes <ElectionMethods at votefair.org>

> OK, this is going to be controversial, but Jameson Quinn and I are
> attempting to write one advantage for each of the four election methods
> supported in our Declaration.
>
> Below are the versions each of us have written.  What does everyone else
> prefer?
>
> We know that the final result will be different from what either of us have
> written, so please suggest improvements -- either as better wordings or as
> requests for what to change.
>
> If we cannot agree on this content, we can leave out these paragraphs and
> let the readers investigate each method without us offering any high-level
> perspective.
>
> ------------- version from Jameson Quinn: -------------
>
> Some examples of advantages claimed for each system are:
>
> * Approval is the simplest of the systems, and thus, in places where voters
> are wary of complexity, may have the best chance of passing. Even at an
> academic conference on social choice theory, where few argued that Approval
> was the overall-best system, it still received the widest support. It also
> is a step towards any of the other systems; any of the systems, if used with
> an approval ballot, ends up being equivalent to approval. Therefore, after
> seeing what issues arose under approval, we might be able to make a
> better-informed choice of which other system to move on to.
>
> * Condorcet systems give the best possible guarantee that the result would
> be consistent with a two-way race. When there is a “Condorcet winner” --- a
> single candidate who could beat any other candidate one-on-one --- most
> people’s sense of fairness and democracy say that such a candidate should
> win.
>
> * Majority Judgment allows a score ballot, the most expressive ballot type
> because it can show the strength of preferences. The advocates of this
> system claim that it gives relatively little incentive for dishonest,
> strategic votes. Also, by focusing on the absolute quality of a candidate,
> rather than their quality relative to other options, it may help avoid a
> situation where a polarized electorate elects an unqualified compromise
> candidate just because both sides prefer such a nonentity to seeing the
> other side win.
>
> * Range also uses the expressive score ballot. This system has been shown
> in simulations to give the results which best-satisfy the voters. It gives
> the best results in this sense with any predetermined fractions of honest
> and strategic voters. It is not known if these simulations accurately
> reflect real voters, who might use strategy in different amounts under
> different voting systems or in different factions.
>
> ------------- version from Richard Fobes: -------------
>
> Although we disagree about various characteristics of the four supported
> methods, most of us agree that:
>
> * Approval voting is the easiest election method in terms of collecting
> preferences (either on ballots or verbally) and in terms of counting.
>
> * Condorcet methods provide the fairest results in the many cases in which
> one candidate – the Condorcet winner – is pairwise preferred over every
> other candidate.
>
> * Majority judgment uses score ballots (which collect the fullest
> preference information) in a way that reduces the effect of strategic
> voting.
>
> * Score voting may provide the mathematically defined "best" overall
> ("optimum") results if voters vote sincerely instead of strategically.
>
> ------------- end -------------
>
> Thanks!
>
> (We are getting close to having the next, and possibly final, version ready
> to review in full.)
>
>
> Richard Fobes
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
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