[EM] Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts

[Richard Fobes]

To Dave Ketchum: Your comments below seem to be the advantages of the 
different ballot types rather than the advantages of the different 
counting methods.

Perhaps we should add a bulleted list of the advantages of each ballot 
type. I had overlooked that idea. Now I think it's a good idea -- if we 
can keep it very short and not overlap the advantages of the counting 
methods.

I am trying to keep my biases out of the document (fairness is very 
important to me!), but so that you know what my bias is, I'll say that I 
agree that eventually score ballots will be a better choice than ranked 
ballots, but so far I haven't seen a counting method that handles them 
in a way that motivates voters to vote sincerely rather than 
strategically. Majority Judgement appears to be better than range 
voting, but as far as I can tell it doesn't "punish" (for lack of a 
better word) strategic voting attempts. Yet I genuinely want the 
document to say something positive about score-ballot-based counting 
methods, so I'm having to rely on feedback from you and others to know 
what needs to be said -- in a way that non-expert readers will understand.

Again, thanks!

Richard Fobes


On 9/1/2011 3:03 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> Thanks to both of you for worthy effort.
>
> On Sep 1, 2011, at 12:38 AM, Richard Fobes wrote:
>
>> OK, this is going to be controversial, but Jameson Quinn and I are
>> attempting to write one advantage for each of the four election
>> methods supported in our Declaration.
>>
>> Below are the versions each of us have written. What does everyone
>> else prefer?
>>
>> We know that the final result will be different from what either of us
>> have written, so please suggest improvements -- either as better
>> wordings or as requests for what to change.
>>
>> If we cannot agree on this content, we can leave out these paragraphs
>> and let the readers investigate each method without us offering any
>> high-level perspective.
>
> --------------- A voter's view by Dave Ketchum -----------
>
> Mark on a ruler those you would be willing to promote toward winning,
> assuming those that you prefer drop out for some reason (in deciding on
> a value, consider what would be meaningful in the election method to be
> used). Then consider the four systems of voting that might be in place:
>
> * Approval - vote for all that you have marked, perhaps excluding the
> least-liked, for you are giving equal backing to all that you vote for.
>
> * Condorcet system - rank all that you have marked, according to their
> positions on the ruler, noting that this makes high-ranked preferred
> over any lesser.
>
> * Majority Judgment - rate those you would rank for Condorcet. Also rate
> the least-liked to help vote counters see how you scale strength.
>
> * Range - same as MJ.
>>
>>
>> ------------- version from Jameson Quinn: -------------
>>
>> Some examples of advantages claimed for each system are:
>>
>> * Approval is the simplest of the systems, and thus, in places where
>> voters are wary of complexity, may have the best chance of passing.
>> Even at an academic conference on social choice theory, where few
>> argued that Approval was the overall-best system, it still received
>> the widest support. It also is a step towards any of the other
>> systems; any of the systems, if used with an approval ballot, ends up
>> being equivalent to approval. Therefore, after seeing what issues
>> arose under approval, we might be able to make a better-informed
>> choice of which other system to move on to.
>>
>> * Condorcet systems give the best possible guarantee that the result
>> would be consistent with a two-way race. When there is a “Condorcet
>> winner” --- a single candidate who could beat any other candidate
>> one-on-one --- most people’s sense of fairness and democracy say that
>> such a candidate should win.
>
> "two-way" means?
>>
>>
>> * Majority Judgment allows a score ballot, the most expressive ballot
>> type because it can show the strength of preferences. The advocates of
>> this system claim that it gives relatively little incentive for
>> dishonest, strategic votes. Also, by focusing on the absolute quality
>> of a candidate, rather than their quality relative to other options,
>> it may help avoid a situation where a polarized electorate elects an
>> unqualified compromise candidate just because both sides prefer such a
>> nonentity to seeing the other side win.
>>
>> * Range also uses the expressive score ballot. This system has been
>> shown in simulations to give the results which best-satisfy the
>> voters. It gives the best results in this sense with any predetermined
>> fractions of honest and strategic voters. It is not known if these
>> simulations accurately reflect real voters, who might use strategy in
>> different amounts under different voting systems or in different
>> factions.
>>
>> ------------- version from Richard Fobes: -------------
>>
>> Although we disagree about various characteristics of the four
>> supported methods, most of us agree that:
>>
>> * Approval voting is the easiest election method in terms of
>> collecting preferences (either on ballots or verbally) and in terms of
>> counting.
>>
>> * Condorcet methods provide the fairest results in the many cases in
>> which one candidate – the Condorcet winner – is pairwise preferred
>> over every other candidate.
>
> When there is no single winner, the vote counting must decide among
> those best approaching winning.
>>
>>
>> * Majority judgment uses score ballots (which collect the fullest
>> preference information) in a way that reduces the effect of strategic
>> voting.
>>
>> * Score voting may provide the mathematically defined "best" overall
>> ("optimum") results if voters vote sincerely instead of strategically.
>>
>> ------------- end -------------
>>
>> Thanks!
>>
>> (We are getting close to having the next, and possibly final, version
>> ready to review in full.)
>>
>> Richard Fobes
>