[EM] a response to Andy J.

Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Mon Oct 31 14:39:41 PDT 2011


2011/10/31 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>

>
>
> On Mon, Oct 31, 2011 at 4:05 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:
>
>>
>>  strategic incentives,
>>>>
>>>
>>> 2. Whether one ranks a second or third choice could only back fire if
>>> there was a close race between your first choice and one of your other
>>> choices for being the third place candidate in the first stage.  This isn't
>>> likely and even then, it's safe to say that the third/fourth place
>>> candidate in the first stage has a less than 1/3rd chance to be the winner
>>> in the second stage.
>>>
>>
>> You are arguing that the costs of adding preferences are probably nil.
>> But essentially the same argument applies to the benefits.
>>
>
> dlw: I'm arguing that the odds of ranking two or three candidates having
> unintended consequences against one's first preference are probably nil.
>  The benefit of increasing the chances that one of one's top two or three
> preferences are among the three finalists and the winner is similarly
> small, but no where near nil.  The odds are always long in most elections,
> but the benefit-side is at least 3 times as great as the cost-side.
>
>>
>>
>>
>>> and LNH.
>>>>
>>> 3. It's no longer 100%, but it's up there.  Similarly, there'd still be
>>> a chance of non-monotonicity, but it'd be relatively low and thereby
>>> unlikely enough not to affect voters strategies dysfunctionally.
>>>
>>
>> LNH matters most in a Burlington-like scenario, where it arguably kept
>> the Republican from winning --- the plurality winner and Condorcet loser
>> among the three frontrunners there. That is, by reassuring the Democrats
>> that it couldn't hurt them to second-rank the Progressive, it prevented a
>> chicken dilemma. This is exactly the situation when the almost-LNH of your
>> system breaks down.
>>
>
> dlw: I beg to differ.  My approach uses the first stage to reduce the
> number of candidates to 3.  In Burlington, those three would have been the
> Dems, Progs and Pubs so the LNH would still be in place in the second
> stage.
>

Hmmm.... I could certainly counter that the Dems could theoretically
third-rank a Dem clone or a turkey candidate in order to push the Prog out
of the top three. The turkey is pretty implausible, but I could imagine it
becoming the norm to run two clones, as in early presidential elections
when VP was not a separate election.

But anyway, you're right, the problem is not as bad as I'd thought.

So I guess I'll accept your proposal in the category of systems like IRV -
systems I support as better than plurality but don't actively promote
because there are better options.

>
>>  Admirable response. I'd have to agree... but of course, I'd guess that
>> >2/3 of that will be *me* convincing *you*. :)
>>
>
I revise that estimate to >1/2 :)

Jameson
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