[EM] a response to Andy J.

[David L Wetzell]

On Mon, Oct 31, 2011 at 4:05 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:

>
>  strategic incentives,
>>>
>>
>> 2. Whether one ranks a second or third choice could only back fire if
>> there was a close race between your first choice and one of your other
>> choices for being the third place candidate in the first stage.  This isn't
>> likely and even then, it's safe to say that the third/fourth place
>> candidate in the first stage has a less than 1/3rd chance to be the winner
>> in the second stage.
>>
>
> You are arguing that the costs of adding preferences are probably nil. But
> essentially the same argument applies to the benefits.
>

dlw: I'm arguing that the odds of ranking two or three candidates having
unintended consequences against one's first preference are probably nil.
 The benefit of increasing the chances that one of one's top two or three
preferences are among the three finalists and the winner is similarly
small, but no where near nil.  The odds are always long in most elections,
but the benefit-side is at least 3 times as great as the cost-side.

>
>
>
>> and LNH.
>>>
>> 3. It's no longer 100%, but it's up there.  Similarly, there'd still be a
>> chance of non-monotonicity, but it'd be relatively low and thereby unlikely
>> enough not to affect voters strategies dysfunctionally.
>>
>
> LNH matters most in a Burlington-like scenario, where it arguably kept the
> Republican from winning --- the plurality winner and Condorcet loser among
> the three frontrunners there. That is, by reassuring the Democrats that it
> couldn't hurt them to second-rank the Progressive, it prevented a chicken
> dilemma. This is exactly the situation when the almost-LNH of your system
> breaks down.
>

dlw: I beg to differ.  My approach uses the first stage to reduce the
number of candidates to 3.  In Burlington, those three would have been the
Dems, Progs and Pubs so the LNH would still be in place in the second
stage.

>
> (I just realized that my "2" and "3" in this list in my prior message were
> actually the same reason.)
>

I've made the same mistake...

>
>> dlw: aye, and I do not rely on that arg alone.
>>
>> For BR-based args, some of my key args I rely on are: the over-reliance
>> on cardinal utility assumptions and the import of the number of effective
>> candidates in an election.  I believe based on my understanding of how BR
>> works that the fewer candidates you got in a BR model that the less extreme
>> are the diffs between AV and IRV.  IMO, 7 candidates is too much for an
>> election model, because there really only tend to be at most 4 serious
>> candidates in most single-winner elections.  It's because of the cost of
>> campaigning is too high relative to the chance of reward when too many
>> serious candidates are in the mix...
>>
>
> Interesting point. I hadn't thought of this as being a pro-IRV (or at
> least, anti-anti-IRV) argument, but now I see what you're saying.
>

Election reform cannot proceed by BR alone...

dlw

>
>
>>
>>> Jameson
>>>
>>> ps. While I spend a lot more words on where I disagree with you, you
>>> seem like a smart person and I bet I agree with you >> 80%.
>>>
>>
>> since you likewise are a smart and sincere person, I'd bet I can get that
>> to be >>90% in a week or so...
>>
>
>  Admirable response. I'd have to agree... but of course, I'd guess that
> >2/3 of that will be *me* convincing *you*. :)
>
> Jameson
>
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