[EM] a response to Andy J.

[Jameson Quinn]

>  strategic incentives,
>>
>
> 2. Whether one ranks a second or third choice could only back fire if
> there was a close race between your first choice and one of your other
> choices for being the third place candidate in the first stage.  This isn't
> likely and even then, it's safe to say that the third/fourth place
> candidate in the first stage has a less than 1/3rd chance to be the winner
> in the second stage.
>

You are arguing that the costs of adding preferences are probably nil. But
essentially the same argument applies to the benefits.



> and LNH.
>>
> 3. It's no longer 100%, but it's up there.  Similarly, there'd still be a
> chance of non-monotonicity, but it'd be relatively low and thereby unlikely
> enough not to affect voters strategies dysfunctionally.
>

LNH matters most in a Burlington-like scenario, where it arguably kept the
Republican from winning --- the plurality winner and Condorcet loser among
the three frontrunners there. That is, by reassuring the Democrats that it
couldn't hurt them to second-rank the Progressive, it prevented a chicken
dilemma. This is exactly the situation when the almost-LNH of your system
breaks down.

(I just realized that my "2" and "3" in this list in my prior message were
actually the same reason.)

> ...
> I would likewise be willing to wager a good deal that the diff between
> circa 90% LNH and 100% LNH is not a good deal-killer, especially for a
> bigger election with potentially a large number of candidates.
>

See above.


>
>>
>>>
>>> Maybe they too are biased in favor of simplicity??
>>> And I don't think the Condorcet criterion is *that important*, as I
>>> think in political elections, our options are inherently fuzzy options and
>>> so all of our rankings are prone to be ad hoc.
>>>
>>
>> Criterion-based arguments might be brittle in the face of noisy input
>> data. BR-based arguments, including those which attempt to account for
>> strategic incentives, are not. In other words: arguing that options are
>> fuzzy does not give a license to ignore the flaws in your proposal.
>>
>
> dlw: aye, and I do not rely on that arg alone.
>
> For BR-based args, some of my key args I rely on are: the over-reliance on
> cardinal utility assumptions and the import of the number of effective
> candidates in an election.  I believe based on my understanding of how BR
> works that the fewer candidates you got in a BR model that the less extreme
> are the diffs between AV and IRV.  IMO, 7 candidates is too much for an
> election model, because there really only tend to be at most 4 serious
> candidates in most single-winner elections.  It's because of the cost of
> campaigning is too high relative to the chance of reward when too many
> serious candidates are in the mix...
>

Interesting point. I hadn't thought of this as being a pro-IRV (or at
least, anti-anti-IRV) argument, but now I see what you're saying.


>
>> Jameson
>>
>> ps. While I spend a lot more words on where I disagree with you, you seem
>> like a smart person and I bet I agree with you >> 80%.
>>
>
> since you likewise are a smart and sincere person, I'd bet I can get that
> to be >>90% in a week or so...
>

Admirable response. I'd have to agree... but of course, I'd guess that >2/3
of that will be *me* convincing *you*. :)

Jameson
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