[EM] [CES #3834] condorcet & range voting -- JQ

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/10/11 Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>

> Hi Jameson,
>
> --- En date de : *Mar 11.10.11, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>* a
> écrit :
>
>
> Note that the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet" is only true for Range
> if voters are strategic *and somewhat knowledgeable about the polls*.
>
>
> I'm curious whether you believe the "more Condorcet-like than Condorcet"
> claim
> based on Warren's IEVS work, or for some other reason.
>

Other reason; mostly because the Nash equilibrium (actually some stronger
equilibrium which I forget) of approval/Range is the CW.


> Because in IEVS, the polls,
> if we call them polls, provide arbitrary data. Nobody is actually polled.
>

Yes, I know. I think this is a weakness of IEVS.


>
> What do you say happens if Range voters are strategic but *not*
> knowledgeable?
> Does that mean they place their "approval cutoffs" potentially arbitrarily?
>

Using some zero-info strategy or arbitrarily.


>
> If so, I think that would still beat all the rank methods with strategic
> but not-
> knowledgeable voters. In that situation every ballot's first preference
> could be nearly
> arbitrary, because in IEVS strategic rank voters *always* use compromise.
>

Yes, that's another, bigger weakness of IEVS. I find it totally implausible
that Condorcet voters would all compromise AND bury, especially without good
knowledge. I think that strategic condorcet could fail to give the CW in
real-life situations, but it is nowhere near as bad as IEVS has it.


>
> Kevin Venzke
>
>
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>
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