[EM] ... wrt Burlington et al.

[robert bristow-johnson]

again, the subject is not about me and the header should reflect that.


On 11/27/11 4:15 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
>
>
>         dlw:       The two major-party equilibrium would be centered
>         around the
>                de facto center.
>
>
>         KM:   But positioning yourself around the de facto center is
>         dangerous
>            in IRV. You might get center-squeezed unless either you or your
>            voters start using strategic lesser-evil logic - the same
>         sort of
>            logic that IRV was supposed to free you from by "being
>         impervious
>            to spoilers".
>
>         dlw: the cost of campaigning in "less local" elections is high
>         enuf that it's hard for a major party to get center-squeezed.
>          And if such did happen, they could reposition to prevent it.
>
>
>     RBJ:the counterexample, again, is Burlington Vermont.  Dems
>     haven't sat in the mayor's chair for decades.
>
>
> dlw: Not sure this is a relevant counter example.  With IRV, the two 
> major parties would become the Progs and the Dems who would be 
> centered around the de facto center of Burlington.
where is this de facto center?  around the Progs?  or the GOP?

>     RBF:
>
who's that?

>     the counterexample, again, is Burlington Vermont.  Dems haven't sat in
>     > the mayor's chair for decades.
>
>     MW: Is this due to a split of the liberal vote by progressives or
>     other
>     liberal blocs? Or is it due to a truly Republican leaning demographic?
>
>
> dlw: More to the point, this is not an arg against IRV since it was 
> only tried for one election in Burlington.

no, we used it in 2006 and 2009.  in 2006, the IRV winner, Plurality 
winner, and Condorcet winner were one and the same person.

> dlw: I would not describe IRV as introducing unstable weirdness.  It 
> maintains a two-party dominated system and facilitates that those two 
> major parties tend to position themselves around the de facto 
> (shifting) center.

the three parties do *not* shift to position themselves around any 
shifting center.  it's much more complicated than that.

> MW:Is this due to a split of the liberal vote by progressives or other
>
>         liberal blocs? Or is it due to a truly Republican leaning
>         demographic?
>
>     RBS:
>
who's that?

>     Burlington is, for the U.S., a very very liberal town with a
>     well-educated and activist populace.  it's the origin of Ben &
>     Jerry's and now these two guys are starting a movement (
>     http://movetoamend.org/ ) to get a constitutional amendment to
>     reverse the obscene Citizens United ruling of the Supreme Court.
>
>     the far north end of Burlington (called the "New North End", also
>     where i live) is a little more suburban in appearance and here is
>     where the GOP hangs in this town.
>
>     the mayors have been Progs with an occasional GOP.  it is
>     precisely the "center squeeze" syndrome and IRV didn't solve that
>     problem. and without getting Condorcet adopted, i am not sure how
>     it will be reversed.
>
>
> dlw: If you had given IRV another election, it would have likely 
> solved the problem.

what problem do you mean (that is likely solved)?

> You cannot seriously think that one Burlington has driven a stake in 
> the heart of IRV for once and forever.
>

it has for Burlington, and likely for the rest of the state (there was 
even a bill passed, but vetoed by the previous governor to use IRV for 
the guv's election, that's where i would argue that precinct summability 
would become a salient problem).


>
>     RBS:
>
????

>     but the only voting methods folks generally see here are FPTP,
>     FPTP with a delayed runoff, and IRV.  and, thanks to FairVote,
>     nearly everyone are ignorant of other methods to tabulate the
>     ranked ballot than the STV method in IRV.
>
>
> dlw: And it was hard work to get people to get IRV..., just think how 
> hard it would be to teach them about 4 very heterogeneous election rules.

IRV, with its kabuki dance of transferred votes, is more complicated 
than Condorcet.  when i was asked by one of the leaders in this town of 
the anti-IRV movement to explain Condorcet simply (since that was most 
of their case against IRV - most of their signs said "Keep Voting 
Simple"), i answered "If more voters agree that Candidate A is a better 
choice for office than Candidate B, then Candidate B is not elected."  
pretty simple and hard to argue with.

often the discussion here and that regarding Approval eventually 
discusses how voters can adapt their voting strategy to the method that 
is advocated for, and i continue to say that this misses the point.  the 
voters shouldn't have to be burdened with any need to strategize at 
all.  and they shouldn't be punished for failing to strategize.

while it is true that Condorcet may tend to favor the centrist (whereas 
IRV favors the largest subgroup in the largest group, e.g. in Burlington 
IRV favored the largest group, the Liberals, and of the Liberals, it 
favored the Progs over the Dems, because there was more Progs), it is no 
reason to adopt Condorcet.  the reason to adopt Condorcet is an argument 
of converse: if a CW exists and you elect any other candidate, the 
election has ignored the specific wishes of the majority of the 
electorate in rejecting the candidate they preferred more to the 
candidate the method elected.  there is no good reason to elect 
Candidate B to office when more of us have explicitly marked our ballots 
that we preferred Candidate A.

-- 

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."