[EM] Jameson: MTA, MJ, MTAOC, SODA

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/11/26 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>

>
> Jameson:
>
> You said:
>
> There are other methods which you don't mention even though their
> advantages are similar to those of the ones you do.
>
> 2011/11/25 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>
>
>
>
> Regarding the co-operation/defection problem, there are about 4
> possibilities:
>
>
>
> 1. Just propose MTA and Keep the co-operation/defection problem.
>
> Majority
>  Judgment has similar advantages to MTA in this case.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Does it? Who knows?


Anyone who takes the time to read the academic
literature<https://sites.google.com/site/ridalaraki/majority-judgment>
.


> Have its proponents told what criteria it meets and specifically what
> guarantees it
> offers?
>
> How does it do in the Approval bad-example?


Same as MTA. That is, honest-votes will reliably give a good result, unlike
unstable Approval; but strategic voting will lead to failure.


> (to compare it to MTAOC)
>
>
If you're unwilling to research the published answers to your own
questions, why do you persist in asking us to look up your alphabet soup in
old posts? For instance, I know what you mean by MTAOC (a system with a
strong dishonest-fill incentive, which could be almost as bad as Borda in
practice), but searching past messages for that acronym just gives the
written-out name, and then it would take a separate search (which, if you
happened to be using a strict search engine, would fail) to find the actual
definition.


> What majority-rule guarantees does it offer? Does it meet 3P or 1CM?
>

It meets 3P, which I happen to remember what it means. If you define
1CM<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/1CM>I'll tell you if it meets
that.


>
> It probably has a strategy situation very much like that of ordinary RV.
> The method of summed scores.
>

No. For most voters in real-world studies of MJ, their honest,
not-even-normalized MJ ballot was strategically optimal. That is clearly
far better than Range.

>
>
> 4. Find a simpler method that has those advantages.
>
> Such as SODA.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Go ahead and propose the enactment of SODA somewhere if you think that a
> method involving
> delegates or proxies is as winnable as methods that do not.
>

I am working to do so. Note that SODA proxies are 100% optional, and also
bound to a predeclared strategy in ways that should prevent most corrupt
proxy use.

>
> If one is going to propose a method involving proxies, then Proxy DD is
> the biggest and most
> ambitious improvment. I described it in a posting when you asked about it.
>

Yes, you reinvented Liquid Democracy / Asset Voting / Delegable Proxy.
That's a very good system but it is a far, far more radical change than
SODA. As Kristofer pointed out, for one thing it abandons the secret ballot
entirely.

Jameson
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