[EM] Markus: Re: Beatpath as a proposal in the U.S.

robert bristow-johnson rbj at audioimagination.com
Tue Nov 22 22:11:37 PST 2011


On 11/19/11 4:24 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
> Hallo,
>
> Mike Ossipoff wrote (19 Nov 2011):
>
> > Beatpath isn't a choice for a proposal in the U.S.
>
Markus, you and your beatpath just have to step aside because MIKE 
OSSIPOFF is clearly the most knowledgeable expert here.

> The Schulze method is analyzed here:
>
> http://m-schulze.webhop.net/schulze1.pdf
>
> The Schulze method satisfies anonymity, neutrality,
> homogeneity, resolvability, Pareto, reversal symmetry,
> mono-raise, mono-add-plump, Condorcet, Smith,
> Schwartz, independence of clones, and independence of
> Smith-dominated alternatives. It satisfies Woodall's
> CDTT criterion, Woodall's plurality criterion,
> Ossipoff's SFC, and Ossipoff's SDSC.
>
> The Schulze method has been published several times
> in scientific journals and in scientific books.
>
> The Schulze method is currently used by more than
> 50 organizations with more than 70,000 members in
> total.

in all seriousness, Markus, everything you said above is true, and i am 
fully convinced that the Schulze method *is* the best method from a POV 
of best inhibiting or resisting voting strategies that make use of 
throwing a clean Condorcet race into a cycle.

but this statement:
> Of all Condorcet methods, that are currently discussed,
> the Schulze method is that method that has the best
> chances of getting adopted.
i disagree with, at least as far as getting adopted for governmental 
elections.  it is much harder to explain than either minmax or 
ranked-pairs.  and, if my understanding is correct, Schulze, 
ranked-pairs, and minimax all pick the same winner in the case where 
there are 3 candidates in the Smith set, is that not so?  so, as 
unlikely as a Condorcet cycle is (and that's the big sale to make to 
voters and legislators about adopting Condorcet, especially after they 
rejected IRV as being "too complicated"), it's even more unlikely that, 
if a cycle ever happens, that more than 3 candidates will be in the 
cycle.  i don't think it will *ever* happen in a governmental election 
that a larger Smith set occurs and Schulze will be needed to select the 
correct winner when ranked-pairs fails to do so.

"The Perfect is the enemy of the Good" and it's so much more important 
to get a Condorcet method adopted than to "go for broke" and get the 
best Condorcet method adopted since there will be effectively no 
difference in the outcomes.

-- 

r b-j                  rbj at audioimagination.com

"Imagination is more important than knowledge."






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