[EM] Jameson: Regarding preference criteria

[Jameson Quinn]

>
>
> Condorcet's Criterion:
>
> If, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and
> everyone votes sincerely,
> then x should win.
>
> My point is that this is equivalent to:

If the ballots are such that it could be the case that, for every y not x,
no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and everyone votes
sincerely, then x should win.

By "equivalent" I mean that it is passed and failed by exactly the same
methods. But my statement is still better in that it prevents pedants from
refusing to face cases where the criterion-required behavior may not
actually be a good idea.

This of course means that no limited-slot method can ever pass the
Condorcet criterion except in a ballots-only sense.

Jameson
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