[EM] Jameson: Regarding preference criteria

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Jameson said:

The point of those criteria was not to have any merit, it was to show why
preference-applying criteria are silly.

[endquote]

Yes, and I told _why_ your criteria were silly. They weren't silly because they
mentioned preferences. They were silly because you wrote silly criteria, something
that can be done with any kind of criteria.

I carefully explained what was silly about them. It wasn't that they mentioned preferences.

Jameson continues:

Let's forget about those criteria

[endquote]

Suit yourself, Jameson.


, because apparently the fact that they
are bad criteria is distracting from the issue here.

[endquote]

Jameson pronounces them "bad criteria" :-)  

So make that claim, Jameson needs to be specific about what he
thinks is wrong with those criteria, and why.


Jameson continues:

 Here are three
statements of the Condorcet criterion:

1. If there is some candidate X such that for every Y != X, more voters
prefer X to Y than vice versa, and no voter insincerely voted Y over X,
then X must win.

[endquote]

Nonsense. Your premise allows everyone preferring X to someone else to not vote
that preference.

Jameson continues:

2. If there is some candidate X such that for every Y != X, there are more
ballots that could prefer X to Y (that is, either they explicitly show that
preference or they were unable to express a preference for X over Y without
losing some other preference information) than those which definitely
prefer Y over X, then X must win.

[endquote]

A meaningless, gibberish attempt at my preference Condorcet's Criterion.

Jameson's #1 and #2 are preference-mentioning criteria, but are garbage. Jameson has merely shown,
again, that it's possible to write garbage preference-mentioning criteria.  --something that he already
established in other recent posts.

Jameson never tells what he means when he says that a ballot prefers one candidate to another.

Condorcet's Criterion:

If, for every y not x, no fewer people prefer x to y than y to x, and everyone votes sincerely,
then x should win.

[end of CC definition]

A voter votes sincerely if s/he doesn't falsify a preference or fail to vote a preference that the method
in use would have allowed hir to vote in addition to the preferences that s/he actually voted.

[end of sincere voting definition]

I've recently defined voting one candidate over another, in a posting with that
expression in its subject-line.

Jameson continues:

3. If there is some candidate X such that for every Y != X, more ballots
prefer X to Y than vice versa, then X must win.

[endquote]

Jameson hasn't said what it means for a ballot to "prefer" one candidate to another.

Jameson continues:

Plurality passes criterion 3. 

[endquote]

It might if the criterion wording meant something.

Jameson continues:

Any non-full-ranking method, including
Condorcet methods like Schulze, fails criterion 1. Obviously, we should be
using criteria which are like 2.

[endquote]

As nearly as it's possible to guess what he means, that's Jameson's sloppy attempt at the preference CC that I defined.
 
Jameson says:

Often, we speak of preferences when
specifying the criteria, as a shorthand for the longer-winded precision as
in criteria 2 above.

??? :-) Precision?

Mike Ossipoff