[EM] TTPD,TR (an FBC complying ABE solution?)

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/11/20 C.Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>

>
> Mike Ossipoff has been understandably concerned about what he calls the
> "Approval
> Bad Example" (ABE), as exemplified by
>
> 49: C     (sincere)
> 27: A>B (sincere)
> 24: B     (sincere is B>C, but are trying to steal election from A).
>

You mean that sincere is B>A.

Also, it's not really important, but I've repeatedly pointed out that the
term "chicken dilemma" is a more descriptive name for this situation, and
also (as far as I know) one which has precedence.


>
> He considers that a voting method must meet the Favorite Betrayal
> Criterion (FBC) and
> also he objects to the B voters in the above scenario being rewarded for
> their "defection"
> from the sincere {A,B} coalition (as they are with any method that meets
> both the Plurality
> and Minimal Defense criteria).
>
> I suggest this method to fill the bill. It uses Kevin Venzke's special
> "Tied-at-the-Top"
> pairwise rule.
>
> http://wiki.electorama.com/**wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_**the_top<http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/index.php?title=Tied_at_the_top>
>
> *Voters submit 3-slot ratings ballots, default rating is Bottom signifying
> least preferred,
> Top rating signifies most preferred, the other ratings slot is Middle.
>
> According to the "Tied-at-the-Top" pairwise rule (TTP), candidate X beats
> candidate Y
> if the number of ballots on which X is given a higher rating than Y  *plus
> the number of
> ballots on which X and Y are both rated Top* is greater than the number of
> ballots on
> which Y is given a higher rating than X.
>
> (And of course vice versa, so it is possible for any pair of candidates X
> and Y that some
> ballots show Top rating for both to TTP beat each other).
>
> If any candidate X  TTP beats any candidate Y, is not in turn TTP beaten
> by Y and is
> not TTP beaten by any candidate Z that doesn't also TTP beat Y, then Y is
> disqualified.
>
> Elect the undisqualified candidate  that is rated Top on the highest
> number of ballots.*
>
> I think and hope this meets the FBC. If  it can be shown not to then I
> will withdraw my
> support for it.  It meets the Mono-add-Plump and the Plurality criteria.
>
> In the above example election no candidate is disqualified and C wins. If
> the B supporters
> vote sincerely then C will be disqualified and A will win.
>
> My suggested name for this method  "Tied at Top Pairwise Disqualification,
> Top Ratings"
> (TTPD,TR) is currently tentative and unenthusiastic, so if  it is agreed
> that it meets the FBC
> then I'm open to other suggestions.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20111121/0bd372bd/attachment-0004.htm>