[EM] (no subject)

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Mike,

--- En date de : Mar 1.11.11, MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com> a écrit :



A criterion compliance chart:

-----------------FBC--------3P-----3PD--------UP----ABE

Bucklin---------Yes--------Yes-----Yes--------Yes----No
MDDA----------Yes---------Yes----Yes---------No----No
DP--------------Yes---------Yes-----No---------No----Yes
MCA------------Yes---------Yes-----No---------No----No
MAMPO---------Yes---------No-----No----------No---No
IRV(= whole)---Yes-------Yes-----Yes--------Yes---Yes
 
 
ER-IRV(whole) doesn't satisfy FBC. You may need to demote your favorite in order
to get a preferable elimination order.
 
Also, I do plan at some point to find an FBC failure of MMPO//MMPO//MMPO//etc.
I'm thinking it may require four candidates. My idea is that by lowering your favorite,
you knock your favorite out of a tie, so that only two candidates remain. But if there
were a three-way tie with no other candidates, MMPO would be stuck. So there
must be a fourth candidate available to be eliminated and allow the method to 
proceed.
 
Maybe I can reword slightly what Jameson said:
If sincere scenario (plus specific assumptions of voter sincerity) "S" can give rise to
cast ballots B, and a criterion C says S must have outcome O, then any method is 
going to have to select outcome O whenever the cast ballots are B. The criterion in
effect is requiring this, even when the scenario isn't S.
 
It's like how SFC is supposed to protect sincere CWs, but in practice it ends up 
also defending some candidates who just look like they *might* be sincere CWs.
 
Kevin
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