[EM] IRV3/AV3

[Jameson Quinn]

It really depends. Real-world data suggests that it could be more common
than that for partisan elections, and (much) less-common for primaries or
nonpartisan elections.

JQ

2011/11/1 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>

> Not as much if there are only 3 candidates, according to Stephen Brams, a
> mathematician determined that in a close 3-way election with only 3
> candidates that the odds of non-monotonicity mattering would be 20%.
>  That's still 4-1 in favor of it not mattering  and close 3-way elections
> are not common.
>
> dlw
>
>
> On Mon, Oct 31, 2011 at 7:51 PM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> 2011/10/31 David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Oct 31, 2011 at 5:59 PM, Andy Jennings <
>>> elections at jenningsstory.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> David,
>>>>
>>>> My strongest feeling about your recently proposed system is that the
>>>> "three" is so arbitrary.
>>>>
>>>> What if there are eight candidates running, and I really like five of
>>>> them?  Then approving three might not be enough.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Most people aren't as politically keen as you are.  We need to design
>>> rules for the typical voter, not ourselves.  I think the number of
>>> contested seats plus two is a good rule of thumb...
>>>
>>>
>>>> I know you said that real elections only seem to have four strong
>>>> candidates, but the current republican primary seems to have at least seven
>>>> totally legitimate candidates in the race.
>>>>
>>>
>>> define totally legit?  From a wonk perspective or a hack perspective?
>>>  There's three realistic candidates right now, and a bunch of me
>>> threes/fours/what-nots
>>> .
>>>
>>>> Both 2008 primaries were the same way.  Sure, the press is constantly
>>>> trying to whittle it down to about four.  But why should we let the press
>>>> do the whittling?  Shouldn't that be done by the voting system in some way?
>>>>  Should we use a different system for these larger elections?
>>>>
>>>
>>> dlw:  It's not just a media thing, it's also a matter of cost-benefit
>>> analysis.  When there's only one winner, it just isn't cost-effective for
>>> there to be lots and lots of candidates.
>>>
>>> My point is based on reality as it is, not as I'd like it to be.  We
>>> need to gear our reforms to reality, not our wishful thinking about how
>>> elections ought to be...
>>>
>>>>
>>>> If there are only three candidates running, then the AV step does
>>>> nothing.  If there are four candidates running, then the AV step is really
>>>> anti-plurality.
>>>>
>>>
>>> dlw: I'm saying that there can be more than three or four candidates on
>>> the ballot, but there tends to be 3 or 4 serious candidates by virtue of
>>> economics of elections.  ..
>>>
>>>>
>>>> And as Kathy pointed out, you'd still better tell people that it's not
>>>> safe to put their favorite first.
>>>>
>>>
>>> dlw: That'd be silly.  If you do the math, while it's possible that
>>> there could be a non-monotonicity problem in the unlikely event of a close
>>> three way election, it's still less likely than the more typical outcome
>>> where it makes sense to vote your preferences.  And so long as the odds
>>> favor the typical outcome, the possibility of a sour grapes situation are
>>> not consequential.  It does not rationally change voter behavior.
>>>
>>
>> In nonpartisan/monopartisan elections, including party primaries, there
>> is unlikely to be a nonmonotonicity problem. In partisan elections where
>> more-or-less one-dimensional spectra are the norm, nonmonotonicity is a
>> very real threat.
>>
>> JQ
>>
>
>
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