[EM] Mike O. and others wrt 3 seat LR Hare

[David L Wetzell]

Mike, I don't read about election rules when the person doesn't suggest
them in a polite manner.

You misunderstood me.  3 seat LR Hare is still LR Hare.  It's just simpler
because of the few number of seats.  This is also why it retains the
one-candidate per party, with the 2nd or 3rd person tacitly on the
party-list, since they could be picked after the election in the event that
the top candidate does well.  Like I wrote, the typical outcome would be
the top 3 candidates win one seat each.  The main exception is that the top
candidate could win 2 seats and pick a vice-candidate if (s)he beats the
third place candidate by more than 1/3rd of the total vote.  This is
consistent with the LR Hare system, but it's simpler.  And simplicity is a
good thing.

And it's deviations from proportionality are not purely random.  They are
systematically in favor of third parties, since a third party can win the
same number of seats as the top vote-getting party with only one fourth or
one third as many votes.

This rule is ideal for a "more local" election that doesn't typically
attract a lot of voter attention.  If an election does not get a lot of
voter attention then we can't really expect them to put the work needed
into researching all of the candidates and we don't want to encourage a
proliferation of candidates.  Sometimes, less is more when you're working
with boundedly rational/interested voters.

But since the third seat would be up for grabs among the third parties and
the top major party, it should start to get more voter attention, which
will result in more attention being given to "more local" issues that are
often neglected in lieu of national issues on which our say-so is quite
low, relative to the amount of time/energy spent on them.
dlw

2011/11/18 <election-methods-request at lists.electorama.com>

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> Today's Topics:
>
>   1. Re to KM wrt 3 seat Largest Remainder Hare andLoring Ensemble
>      Rule. (David L Wetzell)
>   2. Re: Kevin's other posting on votes-only criteria vs
>      preference criteria. (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>   3. David Wetzel, re: (MIKE OSSIPOFF)
>   4.  Electorama/wiki (St?phane Rouillon)
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
> To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at lavabit.com>
> Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 15:47:10 -0600
> Subject: [EM] Re to KM wrt 3 seat Largest Remainder Hare andLoring
> Ensemble Rule.
>
>
> On Fri, Nov 18, 2011 at 7:14 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
> km_elmet at lavabit.com> wrote:
>
>> David L Wetzell wrote:
>>
>>> I blogged about this at my blog a while back in response to the args
>>> given by the Electoral Reform Society of the UK against ordered party list
>>> forms of PR.  http://anewkindofparty.**blogspot.com/2011/05/**
>>> electoral-reform-society-**united-kingdom.html<http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html>
>>>
>>> I think a better way to do a mixed method parliamentary election than
>>> what is done in Germany is to have a large number of 4 seat
>>> super-districts, where 3 seats would be elected with a 3 seat LR Hare and
>>> the 4th seat would be elected by some [deliberately unspecified]
>>> single-winner election rule besides FPTP.
>>>
>>
>> That sounds a lot like the Loring Ensemble Rule. You might be interested
>> in reading about it at http://www.accuratedemocracy.**com/e_ler.htm<http://www.accuratedemocracy.com/e_ler.htm>.
>>
>
> dlw:thankyou, you are far more polite than Mike O. I did look at it.  It's
> similar to the second version that has essentially two separate elections,
> rather than using the ranking info twice.
>
>>
>> Loring argues that Plurality councils can swing wildly and deny
>> representation to people who should be represented, while PR councils can
>> still be off-center due to kingmaker scenarios, and that one should
>> therefore pick a center that can break ties while not giving any voting
>> bloc undue power.
>>
>
> My approach replaces STV with LR Hare, I guess I don't really care whether
> rankings get used or not, but I do like having fewer seats with PR with a
> Hare Quota, so we can avoid those arbitrary percentage restrictions.  It
> lets third parties decide who's the party-in-power but helps the
> party-in-power get more seats so they can get things done if they are
> generally popular, or able to win many of the single-winner elections.
>
>>
>> He then proposes to use STV, but shield the CW from losing. The Condorcet
>> winner represents the center or common consensus position, while the other
>> winners represent the diversity of opinion among the people. Because the
>> process is done inside a single method, in the case the CW is off-center,
>> the proportional representation aspect of the algorithm will even this out
>> by compensating.
>>
>
> The link you gave me though tends to weigh stronger for the 2nd version,
> which is easier to explain to voters by virtue of how it combines two
> already existing elections...
>
>>
>> The same sort of shielding could be used in any type of multiwinner
>> system. If it's sequential, you just keep the CW from being eliminated. If
>> it's combinatorial (like Schulze STV), you only consider those sets of
>> winners that include the CW.
>>
>
> dlw:If I was gung-ho on getting the CW elected that'd be really great, but
> I don't expect great things of the ranking choices of low-info voters like
> we have a lot of in the US.  Does it matter the ratios?  Cuz I really like
> 3:1 multi-winner and single-winner.
>
>
> dlw
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 22:05:09 +0000
> Subject: Re: [EM] Kevin's other posting on votes-only criteria vs
> preference criteria.
>
> Kevin:
>
> You said:
>
> In practice [preference-mentioning criteria] usually have to be translated
> into votes-only criteria in order to figure out how to use or test them.
>
> [endquote]
>
> So what? Regardless of your procedure for applying the criteria, my
> criteria apply to all methods. Votes-only criteria often
> do not, unless you say that Plurality passes Condorcet's criterion.
>
> You continued:
>
> >Well, in my mind a votes-only criterion is independent.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Independent of what? Either you stipulate that Condorcet's Criterion
> applies only to certain methods and not
> to others, or CC gives results that are not as you or anyone else intend.
>
> You continued:
>
> Usually the two versions aren't quite equivalent or can't be easily proven
> to be equivalent.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Of course they're not equivalent. Preference criteria are
> universally-applicable.
>
>
> You continued:
>
> >I think part of the disagreement on this issue is based on who the
> audience is.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Irrelevant.
>
> You continued:
>
> On this list we don't generally have problems with most people using an
> implied Woodall-ish conception of methods and criteria.
>
> [endquote]
>
> That fact that it can be guessed what someone means when using those
> votes-only criteria doesn't answer my
> criticisms of them.
>
> You continue:
>
> If someone wanted to argue that FPP actually does satisfy Condorcet we
> would just tell them they're doing it wrong
>
> [endquote]
>
> You could...and you'd be incorrect thereby.
>
> If there is something wrong with how I interpreted votes-only Condorcet's
> Criterion, for instance,
> when saying that Plurality meets CC, then I invite you to say what is
> wrong with that interpretation of CC.
>
> Tell us how you define CC, minimal defense, and Majority for Solid
> Coalitions, without mentioning
> preference. And then tell what's wrong with the interpretation of those
> criteria whereby Plurality meets
> them.
>
>
>
> You continue:
>
>
> no big deal. Mike seems to be paranoid about people understanding
> criteria contrary to their original intention.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Is that what I said? I thought that I merely said that Plurality meets
> those criteria.
>
> Oh yes, I did also say that your votes-only criteria often rule contrary
> to your intention. That makes nonsense out
> of them and their use.
>
> You continue:
>
> >
> >The inconvenient thing about e.g. SDSC is mostly the "should have a way
> of voting" wording.
>
> [endquote]
>
> How is that inconvenient? It sounds to me as if the meaning is quite plain.
>
> If a majority prefer x to y,
> then there should be a way of voting whereby that majority can vote that
> will insure that
>  y won't win, without any member of that majority voting a less-liked
> candidate equal to or over a more-liked one.
> (other than equal-bottom-ranking them).
>
> The use of the word "should" is commonly used on EM as an expression of
> the criterion's requirement for a method to
> meet the criterion. Is that what you're objecting to. I suppose I could
> have said, "A method meets SDSC if..."
>
> ...or divided the criterion text into "premise" and "requirement" as I did
> with CD.
>
>
> You continue:
>
> In practice this "way of voting" is almost always truncation
>
> It typically requires voting x above bottom, but not y.
>
> You continue:
>
> (which definitely is possible to define within Mike's scheme, as he
> doesn't consider truncation of two candidates to be voting them equal).
>
> [endquote]
>
> For some time I've been including that exception in the criterion's
> wording.
>
> You continued:
>
> >I wonder if SDSC can really be seamlessly applied to any ballot format
> though. Mike seems to assume it is unambiguous what it means to vote a
> candidate above or equal to or below another candidate.
>
> [endquote]
>
> I defined that some years ago. Someone else suggested a much simpler
> definition, which I posted today. I agreed that that definition
> was briefer, and that it was fine with me till such time as someone found
> a problem with it.
>
> If it can be shown that you've found such a problem, then I'll discard
> that briefer definition, and return to the use of my
> longer definition, the one that speaks, more generally, of an election
> with arbitrarily many voters and candidates.
>
> You continue:
>
> If he has a definition for these I imagine it's based on some very
> specific test that wouldn't necessarily reflect general method behavior.
>
> [endquote]
>
> See the definition that I posted today.
>
> You continued:
>
> For example, what if under some method the majority preferring A to B can
> make B lose by ranking B top?
>
> [endquote]
>
> Let's say that that "ranking x higher than y" means that you write that
> candidate's name closer to the "top" of a piece of paper or the top of your
> computer screen, and that "ranking B top" means ranking B over everyone who
> isn't ranked as B is.
>
> Then, in your questionably-proposable method, and by the definition that I
> posted today, ranking B, but not A, at top
> qualifies as voting A over B, if that would defeat B even if you were the
> only voter and A & B were the only candidates.
>
> If not, then we'd need to know more about the method that you're hinting
> at but not specifying.
>
> You continue:
>
> One could say (see definition below) that this is no good, because B is
> being ranked "over" A. But how do we know whether that's "over"?
>
> [endquote]
>
> We know that because of how I defined "ranking x at top", above in this
> posting.
>
> You continue:
>
> Based on this one very counterintuitive result, it doesn't look like
> "over."
>
> [endquote]
>
> Well, you're the one (not quite) specifying that method. Don't attribute
> its irrationality to me.
>
> You haven't shown that it makes a problem for my definitions.
>
> You continue:
>
> >What if voters can vote cycles? What if they put candidates in
> color-coded buckets and the outcome is determined by even vs. odd vote
> counts?
>
> My definition of voting one candidate over another has nothing to do with
> any particular balloting format or count rule.
>
> Again, you'd need to be more clear with us regarding the method that you
> want to specify, before it and its consequences can be addressed.
>
> You continue:
>
> I think at some point, any criterion scheme has to say "use your head, you
> know what I'm trying to say," and where it says that is mostly a matter of
> taste.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Saying that you think that isn't the same as demonstrating it. If you want
> to claim that no criterion can be defined so that,
> unambiguously, by its stated meaning, every reasonable method passes or
> fails it, then the burden is on you to demonstrate that.
>
> Until you do, saying, "You know what I mean", doesn't adequately
> substitute for saying what you mean.
>
>
> You continue:
>
> >For reference, this is SDSC:
>
> >If a majority of all the voters prefer A to B, then they should have a
> way of voting that will ensure that B won't win, without any member of that
> majority voting a less-liked candidate equal to or over a more-liked
> candidate.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Correct, except I have added to that wording "...other than ranking them
> both at bottom."
>
> Not many methods meet SDSC. ABucklin and MDD,ABucklin do.
>
> But difficultly-attainable criteria are useful for describing advantages
> offered by only a few methods.
>
> 1CM is attainable by more methods.
>
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
> >
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
> To: <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 22:27:23 +0000
> Subject: [EM] David Wetzel, re:
>
> David:
>
> MO:1. Proportional Representation is obsolete, now that we have
> technology to easily implement Proxy Direct Democracy. (I discussed
> Proxy DD in a fairly recent post).
>
> You said:
>
> dlw: I will look into it if you ask me kindly to do so and provide me
> a link to a good summary of it.
>
> [endquote]
>
> I don't ask you kindly to do so. That's up to you. But I will tell you
> this: A good summary of it
> can be found in a recent posting by me at this forum. I'll look up the date
> of the posting, and will post that date, and a copy of the Proxy DD
> discussion
> in that posting.
>
> MO: 2. Largest Remainder, with the Hare quota, doesn't favor small
> parties. It's
>
>
> unbiased with respect to party-size. But it's also not very proportional.
>
> You said:
>
>  Unlike most forms of PR,
> it [your Hare Largest Remainder] doesn't require quotas.
>
> Then it isn't Largest Remainder. The designation "Hare" refers to
> the use of the Hare quota.
>
> MO:It has lots of random deviation from proportionality.
>
> You said:
>
> dlw:*Random?*
>
> [endquote]
>
> Yes. I don't know what you're calling Largest Remainder, but real Largest
> Remainder
> randomly deviates from proportionality.
>
>
> You said:
>
> ...  That is
> what I mean when it favors small parties.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Fine. Then it isn't Largest Remainder with the Hare quota.
>
> You said:
>
> It is not a random
> deviation from proportionality.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Again, then it ish't LR.
>
>
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From: "Stéphane Rouillon" <stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca>
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Date: Fri, 18 Nov 2011 22:08:13 -0500
> Subject: [EM] Electorama/wiki
> **
> How do we save Edits on the electowiki....?
> I can't see changes I made to the Proportional Representation page..
>
> On 2011-11-18 00:18, Jameson Quinn wrote:
>
> I agree with Chris.
>
>  But mostly, I'm writing to say that I would really like someone to fill
> in:
>
>  http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MDDTR
> http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/MTA
>
>  Of course, redirects are fine. And you don't have to put in all sorts of
> sections for compliances and such if you don't know them, just a few
> sentences explaining the method itself is plenty.
>
>  Thanks,
> Jameson
>
> 2011/11/17 C.Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>
>>
>>   49: C
>>>  27: A>B
>>>  24: B
>>>
>>>  I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike specifies then a
>>> just interventionist mind-reading God
>>> should award the election to A.
>>>
>>> [endquote]
>>>
>>> Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in other
>>> instances?
>>>
>>
>>
>> Yes. If the method used meets Later-no-Harm but fails Later-no-Help, i.e
>> has
>> a strong random-fill incentive like the MDD,TR method that Mike is
>> advocating, there
>> isn't any good reason to assume that the Middle ratings are sincere.
>>
>> So it could be that all the voters really have no interest in any
>> candidate except their favourites
>> and sincere is
>>
>> 49: C
>> 27: A
>> 24: B
>>
>> in which case C is the strong sincere Condorcet winner, or as Jameson
>> pointed out it could
>> be worse still and the A voters were Burying against C so sincere is
>>
>> 49: C
>> 27: A>C
>> 24: B
>>
>>
>>  Chris continues:
>>>
>>> Given the incentives of the MDD,TR method that Mike is advocating, it is
>>> only reasonable to assume that the truncators
>>> are all sincere
>>>
>>> [endquote]
>>>
>>> Wait a minute: I'm not saying that B truncation is a problem in MDDTR or
>>> MMPO. In fact,
>>> my point is that it is _not_.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Truncation isn't a "problem" (for the full-rankers) as an  "offensive
>> strategy". The problem is that it
>> isn't fair to the sincere truncators.
>>
>>
>>  Wait a minute. These candidates in this example are A, B, and C.
>>>
>>> How does A lack legitimacy? Among the candidates not majority-defeated, A
>>> has more favoriteness-supporters than any other candidate.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Translation: "I love this arbitrary algorithm, so any winner it produces
>> is by definition legitimate."
>>
>> A's win lacks legitimacy simply because there is another candidate that
>> was vastly better supported on
>> the ballots.
>>
>> If we add between 2 and 21 ballots that plump for A, then C's
>> "majority-defeatedness" goes away and
>> the winner changes from A to C, another failure of  Mono-add-Plump.
>>
>> If we nonetheless accept that C but not A should be immediately
>> disqualified, electing the undisqualified
>> candidate with the most top-ratings is just another arbitrary feature of
>> the algorithm.
>>
>> Why that candidate and not the one that is most approved?  Based on the
>> information actually on the ballots,
>> no faction of voters has a very strong post-election complaint against B.
>>
>> Chris Benham
>>
>>
>> 49: C
>> 27: A>B
>> 21: A   (new voters, whose ballots change the MDD,TR winner from A to C)
>> 24: B
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Mike Ossipoff wrote (17 Nov 2011):
>>
>> Chris said:
>>
>> Mike refers to this scenario:
>>
>> > The Approval bad-example is an example of that. I'll give it again here:
>> >
>> > Sincere preferences:
>> >
>> > 49: C
>> > 27: A>B
>> > 24: B>A
>> >
>> > A majority _equally strongly_ prefer A and B to C.
>> >
>> >
>> > Actual votes:
>> >
>> > The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the
>> > co-operativeness and
>> > responsibility of the A voters:
>> >
>> > 49: C
>> > 27: A>B
>> > 24: B
>> >
>>
>> I agree that *if* the sincere preferences are as Mike specifies then a
>> just interventionist mind-reading God
>> should award the election to A.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Fine. But can Chris say what's wrong with that outcome in other instances?
>>
>> Chris continued:
>>
>> But a voting method's decisions and philosophical justification should
>> be based on  information that is actually
>> on the ballots, not on some guess or  arbitrary assumption about some
>> maybe-existing "information" that isn't.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Why? Why shouldn't a voting system avoid a worst-case, if, by so doing,
>> it hasn't been shown to act seriously wrongly in other cases?
>>
>> And MMPO & MDDTR don't just bring improvement in the Approval
>> bad-example. They,
>> in general, get rid of any strategy dilemma regarding whether you should
>> middle-rate
>> a lesser-evil instead of bottom-rating hir. For instance, consider the
>> A 100, B 15, C 0 utility example.
>>
>> In MCA, there's a question about whether you should middle-rate or
>> bottom-rate B. In
>> MDDTR and MMPO, that dilemma is completely eliminated.
>>
>> In those methods, middle rating someone can never help hir against your
>> favorite(s).
>>
>> Chris continues:
>>
>> I think a very reasonable tenet is that if, based on the information on
>> the ballots, candidate X utterly dominates
>> candidate Y then we should not elect Y.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Yes, there are many reasonable tenets among the aesthetic criteria.
>>
>> Chris continues:
>>
>> For several reasons (for those who can pooh-pooh this as "merely
>> aesthetic"): electing Y gives the supporters
>> of X a  very strong post-election complaint with no common-sense or
>> philosophically cogent answer, X is highly
>> likely to be higher Social Utility (SU),  Y's victory will have
>> compromised legitimacy.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Wait a minute. These candidates in this example are A, B, and C.
>>
>> How does A lack legitimacy? Among the candidates not majority-defeated, A
>> has more favoriteness-supporters than any other candidate.
>>
>> Chris continues:
>>
>> The Plurality criterion is one very reasonable criterion that says that
>> C  is so much stronger than A that the election
>> of  A can't be justified. .
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> There are lots of aesthetic criteria that say things like that, and they
>> all sound
>> aesthetically reasonable. How great is their practical strategic
>> importance?
>>
>>
>> Chris continued:
>>
>> There are other criteria I find reasonable
>> that say the same thing:
>>
>> "Strong Minimal Defense": If the number of ballots on which both X is
>> voted above bottom and Y isn't is greater than
>> the total number of ballots on which Y is voted above bottom, then don't
>> elect Y.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> But can you word that in such a way that it isn't met by Plurality?
>>
>> What sort of strategic guarantees are protected by the criteria
>> that you propose in this posting?
>>
>> Chis continues:
>>
>> The election of  A is unacceptable because C's domination of  A is
>> vastly more impressive than A's pairwise win over
>> B.  The Plurality criterion plus the three other criteria I define above
>> all loudly say "not A".
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> In other words, it looks bad from those perspectives.
>>
>> The election of A is justified by its being consistent with FBC, SFC or
>> SFC3,
>> freedom from dilemma about middle-rating a compromise, and either
>> Later-No-Harm or non"failure" in Kevin's MMPO bad-example.  --things that
>> are
>> guaranteed by MMPO and MDDTR.
>>
>> Additionally, as I was showing to Jameson, electing A in these methods
>> isn't really wrong.
>>
>>
>>
>> > The A voters defect, in order to take advantage of the
>> > co-operativeness and
>> > responsibility of the A voters:
>>
>> Chris replies:
>>
>> The plausibility of  arbitrary claims about the voters' sincere
>> preferences and motivations
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> More a matter of "what if", rather than claims.
>>
>> Chris continued:
>>
>> can weighed in the light of the
>> used election method's incentives. How is it so "co-operative and
>> responsible" of the A voters to rank B when doing
>> so (versus truncating) can only help their favourite?
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> It's co-operative because it defeats the candidate commonly disliked by A
>> voters and B voters, in MCA, MDDTR and MMPO.
>>
>> If neither did that, C would win.
>>
>> If the A voters refused to, and, instead, the B voters co-operated, then
>> it would
>> be B would win, by being the defectors.
>>
>> Chris continues:
>>
>> And why would the
>> B voters be insincerely truncating ("defecting")
>> when doing so can only harm their favourite?
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> In MCA that defection could give their favorite the win, if the A voters
>> have
>> co-operated, in spite of the A voters being more numerous.
>>
>> In MPPO or MDDTR, the problem doesn't exist. The A voters can co-operate
>> or
>> defect, and A will still win, having more top ratings. Hardly a
>> controversial
>> result.
>>
>> Chris continues:
>>
>> Given the incentives of the MDD,TR method that Mike is advocating, it is
>> only reasonable to assume that the truncators
>> are all sincere
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Wait a minute: I'm not saying that B truncation is a problem in MDDTR or
>> MMPO. In fact,
>> my point is that it is _not_.  But co-operaton/defection is indeed a
>> problem in MCA.
>> Hency my advocacy of MDDTR and MMPO.
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
>
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>
>
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