[EM] A secure distributed election scheme based on Bitcoin's Proof-of-Work protocol
Andy Jennings
elections at jenningsstory.com
Sat Jun 18 08:46:45 PDT 2011
On Sat, Jun 18, 2011 at 7:50 AM, Mike Frank <michael.patrick.frank at gmail.com
> wrote:
> Even if the total resources deployed on the Bitcoin network were to someday
> fall to such a low level that a single attacker could easily produce a
> forged chain of transactions, that would only mean that this attacker could
> double-spend their own coins from that point onwards, not that they could
> nullify the established chain that was already in existence and accepted by
> all nodes on the network.
>
If the attacker truly had disproportionate computing resources, couldn't he
go back to the chain as it was a year ago and start extending from there?
If he could make the forged chain longer than the real chain, wouldn't that
invalidate every bitcoin mined and every peer-to-peer transaction in the
last year?
Andy
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