[EM] C//A

C.Benham cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Thu Jun 16 08:50:24 PDT 2011


Forest Simmons wrote  (12 June 2011):

> I think the following complete description is simpler than anything 
> possible for ranked pairs:
>
> 1.  Next to each candidate name are the bubbles (4) (2) (1).  The 
> voter rates a candidate on a scale from
> zero to seven by darkening the bubbles of the digits that add up to 
> the desired rating.
>
> 2.  We say that candidate Y beats candidate Z pairwise iff Y is rated 
> above Z on more ballots than not.
>
> 3.  We say that candidate Y covers candidate X iff Y pairwise beats 
> every candidate that X pairwise
> beats or ties.
>
> [Note that this definition implies that if Y covers X, then Y beats X 
> pairwise, since X ties X pairwise.]
>
> Motivational comment:  If a method winner X is covered, then the 
> supporters of the candidate Y that
> covers X have a strong argument that Y should have won instead.
>
> Now that we have the basic concepts that we need, and assuming that 
> the ballots have been marked
> and collected, here's the method of picking the winner:
>
> 4.  Initialize the variable X with (the name of) the candidate that 
> has a positive rating on the greatest
> number of ballots.  Consider X to be the current champion.
>
> 5.  While X is covered, of all the candidates that cover X, choose the 
> one that has the greatest number of
> positive ratings to become the new champion X.
>
> 6.  Elect the final champion X.
>
> 7.  If in step 4 or 5 two candidates are tied for the number of 
> positive ratings, give preference (among the
> tied) to the one that has the greatest number of ratings above level 
> one.  If still tied, give preference
> (among the tied) to the one with the greatest number of ratings above 
> the level two.  Etc.
>
> Can anybody do a simpler description of any other Clone Independent 
> Condorcet method?


Forest,

I like this Condorcet method very much and endorse it.

The 8-slot (including zero) addition ratings ballot idea is clever, but 
would it really be acceptable as a public proposal in the US?

Chris Benham





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