[EM] C//A

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

Chris,

from the responses I've been getting it appears that the ballot would not be accepted.  Even the simpler 
four slot ballot with two bubbles [(2)  (1)] is deemed too complicate by the EM list members if it is to be 
interpreted as a score equal to the sum of the darkened digits.  Not that people cannot add one to two, 
but that the idea is too far out.

But I could argue that if the idea of rating on a scale of zero to two using the two bubbles is acceptable, 
by darkening (1) for a score of one, or (2) for a score of (2), then how is it so much harder to say that if 
both bubbles are darkened, we will interpret that as a score of three?

My Best,

Forest

----- Original Message -----
From: "C.Benham" 
Date: Thursday, June 16, 2011 8:51 am
Subject: C//A
To: election-methods-electorama.com at electorama.com
Cc: Forest W Simmons 

> Forest Simmons wrote (12 June 2011):
> 
> > I think the following complete description is simpler than 
> anything 
> > possible for ranked pairs:
> >
> > 1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles (4) (2) (1). 
> The 
> > voter rates a candidate on a scale from
> > zero to seven by darkening the bubbles of the digits that add 
> up to 
> > the desired rating.
> >
> > 2. We say that candidate Y beats candidate Z pairwise iff Y 
> is rated 
> > above Z on more ballots than not.
> >
> > 3. We say that candidate Y covers candidate X iff Y pairwise 
> beats 
> > every candidate that X pairwise
> > beats or ties.
> >
> > [Note that this definition implies that if Y covers X, then Y 
> beats X 
> > pairwise, since X ties X pairwise.]
> >
> > Motivational comment: If a method winner X is covered, then 
> the 
> > supporters of the candidate Y that
> > covers X have a strong argument that Y should have won instead.
> >
> > Now that we have the basic concepts that we need, and assuming 
> that 
> > the ballots have been marked
> > and collected, here's the method of picking the winner:
> >
> > 4. Initialize the variable X with (the name of) the candidate 
> that 
> > has a positive rating on the greatest
> > number of ballots. Consider X to be the current champion.
> >
> > 5. While X is covered, of all the candidates that cover X, 
> choose the 
> > one that has the greatest number of
> > positive ratings to become the new champion X.
> >
> > 6. Elect the final champion X.
> >
> > 7. If in step 4 or 5 two candidates are tied for the number 
> of 
> > positive ratings, give preference (among the
> > tied) to the one that has the greatest number of ratings above 
> level 
> > one. If still tied, give preference
> > (among the tied) to the one with the greatest number of 
> ratings above 
> > the level two. Etc.
> >
> > Can anybody do a simpler description of any other Clone 
> Independent 
> > Condorcet method?
> 
> 
> Forest,
> 
> I like this Condorcet method very much and endorse it.
> 
> The 8-slot (including zero) addition ratings ballot idea is 
> clever, but 
> would it really be acceptable as a public proposal in the US?
> 
> Chris Benham
> 
> 
>