[EM] Defensive strategy for Condorcet methods

[Jameson Quinn]

>
>
> If you want something that deters burial strategy, how about what I called
> FPC? Each candidate's penalty is equal to the number of first-place votes
> for those who beat him pairwise. Lowest penalty wins.
> Burying a candidate may help in engineering a cycle, but it can't stack
> more first-place votes against him. Unfortunately, it's not monotone.
>

Of course, this causes favorite betrayal strategy, because you may care more
about giving a penalty than about helping your honest favorite. And this
strategy is "obvious" enough that I think people would overuse it, even when
there was an honest CW (for instance, Nader voters in a Nader/Gore/Bush
scenario).

One way to avoid such "overfitting" (solving one problem but causing
another) is to have a runoff between the winners of two different methods,
if they differ. For instance, minimax and FPC. Of course, that throws
simplicity entirely out the window.


>
> Finding the most strategy-resistant monotone Condorcet method is an
> interesting problem. If you permit approval cutoffs, UncAAO and C//A are
> probably quite good, but if not... what, I wonder? Perhaps some Ranked Pairs
> variant where winning contests are sorted ahead of losing contests, and then
> sorted further by FPP score of the first person in the ordering (e.g. A for
> A>B and B for B>A)? Or some Maxtree generalization. Who knows?
>
>
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