[EM] C//A

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

Some folks have opined that the ballot line
[candidate name]  (4)  (2)  (1)
Is too complicated.

How about just
[name]  (2)  (1)
with the understanding that the score that you assign to the name is the sum of the digits of the bubbles 
that you darken, namely zero (for the empty sum), one, two, or two plus one.

The only arithmetic you need to know is that  2+1 is greater than 2, which is greater than one, which is 
greater than nothing.

If that is too complicated, then we are left with the only thing simpler, namely Plurality ballots, which 
means that the possible methods are Plurality, Asset, Approval, and SODA.

In any case, I think that the 2+1 style ballots are adequate for Condorcet methods, because even when 
your favorite is not in the top three cycle, you can still rate these four candidates distinctly.