[EM] C//A
Kathy Dopp
kathy.dopp at gmail.com
Sun Jun 12 15:20:17 PDT 2011
I like it Forest - Very simple and yet it makes a lot of sense. I can
think of no objections to such a method. What does C/A stand for?
Condorcet/Approval?
> From: fsimmons at pcc.edu
> To: election-methods at lists.electorama.com
> Subject: [EM] C//A
> Message-ID: <e38f8415600fc.4df3f773 at pcc.edu>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
> Another solution is to infer the rankings from range style ballots. (As a retired teacher I find iot easier to
> rate than to rank, anyway.)
>
> Whether or not it is easier to rate or to rank, I think that C//A works out better with cardinal ballots than
> with ordinal ballots:
>
> Elect the candidate X that (for any other candidate Y) is rated higher than Y on more ballots than Y is
> rated higher than X. If no such candidate exists, elect the candidate that is rated above zero on the
> greatest number of ballots. In case of a tie, among the tied candidates, elect the one rated above one
> on the greatest number of ballots. If still tied, among the still tied elct the one rated above two on the
> greatest number of ballots. Etc.
>
> In this version (with ratings on a scale of zero to N, with N at least seven, you will never have to use a
> random tie breaker.
>
>
--
Kathy Dopp
http://electionmathematics.org
Town of Colonie, NY 12304
"One of the best ways to keep any conversation civil is to support the
discussion with true facts."
Fundamentals of Verifiable Elections
http://kathydopp.com/wordpress/?p=174
View some of my research on my SSRN Author page:
http://ssrn.com/author=1451051
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