[EM] C//A

[Dave Ketchum]

Somehow this drifted away from being usable for someone with literacy  
weakness.

On Jun 12, 2011, at 5:42 PM, fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:

> Kristofer,
>
> I think the following complete description is simpler than anything  
> possible for ranked pairs:
>
> 1.  Next to each candidate name are the bubbles (4) (2) (1).  The  
> voter rates a candidate on a scale from
> zero to seven by darkening the bubbles of the digits that add up to  
> the desired rating.

You can vote for one or more:
      1. Start by ranking the best by marking it with the highest  
number.
      2. If there are other candidates you like equally well, rank  
them the same.
      3. If there remain other candidates you wish to vote for, though  
liking them a bit less, rank the best of them with a slightly smaller  
number, and go back to step 2.
      The ballots are read as if in a race between each pair of  
candidates, with your ranking deciding which member of each pair wins  
a point.
>
>
> 2.  We say that candidate Y beats candidate Z pairwise iff Y is  
> rated above Z on more ballots than not.
>
> 3.  We say that candidate Y covers candidate X iff Y pairwise beats  
> every candidate that X pairwise
> beats or ties.
>
> [Note that this definition implies that if Y covers X, then Y beats  
> X pairwise, since X ties X pairwise.]
>
> Motivational comment:  If a method winner X is covered, then the  
> supporters of the candidate Y that
> covers X have a strong argument that Y should have won instead.
>
> Now that we have the basic concepts that we need, and assuming that  
> the ballots have been marked
> and collected, here's the method of picking the winner:

Counting better have less literacy problems.  For starters, what does  
"positive rating" mean?

I still like the X*X matrix.  BTW, while some races may be in a single  
precinct, the district for a race for senate or governor is a whole  
state.
>
>
> 4.  Initialize the variable X with (the name of) the candidate that  
> has a positive rating on the greatest
> number of ballots.  Consider X to be the current champion.
>
> 5.  While X is covered, of all the candidates that cover X, choose  
> the one that has the greatest number of
> positive ratings to become the new champion X.
>
> 6.  Elect the final champion X.
>
> 7.  If in step 4 or 5 two candidates are tied for the number of  
> positive ratings, give preference (among the
> tied) to the one that has the greatest number of ratings above level  
> one.  If still tied, give preference
> (among the tied) to the one with the greatest number of ratings  
> above the level two.  Etc.
>
> Can anybody do a simpler description of any other Clone Independent  
> Condorcet method?