[EM] C//A

[Dave Ketchum]

What is wrong with what I wrote here?

I am addressing voters used to Plurality voters who may have never  
voted per Condorcet.

I do not talk of bubbles, but this detail depends on design of the  
ballot.

I do not talk of  such as "if Y covers X, then Y beats X" - just the  
basics of assigning higher numbers to candidates liked best.

Or "ranked pairs" which will matter only when the voter gets a lot of  
sophistication.

I do not talk of strategy because it is a big topic and I am covering  
only the basics.

On Jun 12, 2011, at 8:56 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:

> Somehow this drifted away from being usable for someone with  
> literacy weakness.
>
> On Jun 12, 2011, at 5:42 PM, fsimmons at pcc.edu wrote:
>
>> Kristofer,
>>
>> I think the following complete description is simpler than anything  
>> possible for ranked pairs:
>>
>> 1.  Next to each candidate name are the bubbles (4) (2) (1).  The  
>> voter rates a candidate on a scale from
>> zero to seven by darkening the bubbles of the digits that add up to  
>> the desired rating.
>
> You can vote for one or more:
>     1. Start by ranking the best by marking it with the highest  
> number.
>     2. If there are other candidates you like equally well, rank  
> them the same.
>     3. If there remain other candidates you wish to vote for, though  
> liking them a bit less, rank the best of them with a slightly  
> smaller number, and go back to step 2.
>     The ballots are read as if in a race between each pair of  
> candidates, with your ranking deciding which member of each pair  
> wins a point.
>>
>>
>> 2.  We say that candidate Y beats candidate Z pairwise iff Y is  
>> rated above Z on more ballots than not.
>>
>> 3.  We say that candidate Y covers candidate X iff Y pairwise beats  
>> every candidate that X pairwise
>> beats or ties.
>>
>> [Note that this definition implies that if Y covers X, then Y beats  
>> X pairwise, since X ties X pairwise.]
>>
>> Motivational comment:  If a method winner X is covered, then the  
>> supporters of the candidate Y that
>> covers X have a strong argument that Y should have won instead.
>>
>> Now that we have the basic concepts that we need, and assuming that  
>> the ballots have been marked
>> and collected, here's the method of picking the winner:
>
> Counting better have less literacy problems.  For starters, what  
> does "positive rating" mean?
>
> I still like the X*X matrix.  BTW, while some races may be in a  
> single precinct, the district for a race for senate or governor is a  
> whole state.
>>
>>
>> 4.  Initialize the variable X with (the name of) the candidate that  
>> has a positive rating on the greatest
>> number of ballots.  Consider X to be the current champion.
>>
>> 5.  While X is covered, of all the candidates that cover X, choose  
>> the one that has the greatest number of
>> positive ratings to become the new champion X.
>>
>> 6.  Elect the final champion X.
>>
>> 7.  If in step 4 or 5 two candidates are tied for the number of  
>> positive ratings, give preference (among the
>> tied) to the one that has the greatest number of ratings above  
>> level one.  If still tied, give preference
>> (among the tied) to the one with the greatest number of ratings  
>> above the level two.  Etc.
>>
>> Can anybody do a simpler description of any other Clone Independent  
>> Condorcet method?