[EM] C//A

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

> From: Jameson Quinn 
> > I think voters could be confused over that where one truncates 
> actually> matters to the method. That is, the method isn't 
> resolvable if everybody
> > votes untruncated and there's a cycle; no single ballot can 
> break the tie
> > unless it also breaks the cycle. Further, if only some people 
> truncate, that
> > would give power to them.
> >
> >
> I understand that there's a strategically-important difference, 
> for an
> honest A>B>C voter, between A>B and A. However, I think that 
> it's entirely
> natural for such a voter to truncate C at least. Even if there's an
> unelectable D=Cthulu, most people's first instinct would be to 
> truncateC=Sheriff of Nottingham.

Another solution is to infer the rankings from range style ballots. (As a retired teacher I find iot easier to 
rate than to rank, anyway.)

Whether or not it is easier to rate or to rank, I think that C//A works out better with cardinal ballots than 
with ordinal ballots:

Elect the candidate X that (for any other candidate Y) is rated higher than Y on more ballots than Y is 
rated higher than X.  If no such candidate exists, elect the candidate that is rated above zero on the 
greatest number of ballots.  In case of a tie, among the tied candidates, elect the one rated above one 
on the greatest number of ballots.  If still tied, among the still tied elct the one rated above two on the 
greatest number of ballots. Etc.

In this version (with ratings on a scale of zero to N, with N at least seven, you will never have to use a 
random tie breaker.