[EM] PR for USA or UK
Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon Jul 25 15:27:22 PDT 2011
Hi Toby,
--- En date de : Lun 25.7.11, Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk> a écrit :
>But to summarise a
>possibility - everyone submits their range ballots. Then the computer
>calculates what would be the winning set of candidates under these
>votes. Then each ballot is looked at again by the computer and it
>works out the "optimum" vote for each voter on the basis of what
>everyone else has done. These new votes are then "submitted".
>Obviously everyone's changes at once so the goalposts move. But
>they could be recalculated a few times, and it might approach some
>form of equilibrium. But I'm not entirely sure at the moment how you
>would decide the optimum vote for someone based on the current
>situation. I'll think about it though.
Actually we are discussing this sort of thing in the automated approval
posts.
The problem (if it is a problem) is that if this method does a good
job, you will (in the single-winner case) get a Condorcet method, or
very close. Because, even if you only like a candidate 3/10, if that
is the best candidate you can hope for, the method will still "decide"
that you should get behind that candidate and help him win.
Really, I think Approval and Range work this way anyway, just without
a computer.
>What I like about the range ballot here is that it sets out in
>advance each voter's preference for whole sets of candidates. It
>would work on the basis that how a voter rates a set of candidates is
>realted to their total score given to them. So if there are two to be
>elected then two candidates they give 5 out of 10 to is the same
>as a 10 and a 0. I would set that out as how the scores are
>essentially defined. With ranks I don't know if 1st and 4th is
>better or worse than 2nd and 3rd.
Yes, that's nice. There are Condorcet methods that use this data to
resolve cycles and deter certain strategies. But I don't know of a
method that uses this data, in an effective way, to elect candidates
who are somehow different in quality from Condorcet winners.
Kevin Venzke
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