[EM] Single Contest

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies the majority criterion, then you can skip step 
one, and the method becomes smoother.

Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies the majority criterion:  DSC, Bucklin, and the 
following range ballot based method:

Elect the candidate X with the greatest value of p such that more than p/2 percent of the ballots rate X at 
least p percent of the maxRange value.

That method is similar to the one that Andy Jennings suggested recently, and which I think could be the 
method to choose the other finalist:

Elect the candidate Y with the greatest value of p such that at least p percent of the ballots rate Y at p 
percent of the maxRange value or higher.

If these last two methods are used to choose the finalists, X and Y, then a strict majority top rated 
candidate will automatically win.  The voters don't have to agonize over approval cutoffs, they can just 
grade the candidates on a scale of zero to maxRange.  In fact that's what Andy had in mind ... an 
approval-like method that sets the cutoff level (in the sense that Bucklin can be thought of as a method 
for setting the approval cutoff level), but in a more robust way than Bucklin. In addition the composite 
method is monotone, and at least marginally clone independent (i.e. in the same way that Range is)..