[EM] Single Contest

[Jameson Quinn]

To be clear: if X and Y are the same, there's no need for a runoff?

2011/7/23 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

> If one of the finalists is chosen by a method that satisfies the majority
> criterion, then you can skip step
> one, and the method becomes smoother.
>
> Here are some possibilities for the method that satisfies the majority
> criterion:  DSC, Bucklin, and the
> following range ballot based method:
>
> Elect the candidate X with the greatest value of p such that more than p/2
> percent of the ballots rate X at
> least p percent of the maxRange value.
>
> That method is similar to the one that Andy Jennings suggested recently,
> and which I think could be the
> method to choose the other finalist:
>
> Elect the candidate Y with the greatest value of p such that at least p
> percent of the ballots rate Y at p
> percent of the maxRange value or higher.
>
> If these last two methods are used to choose the finalists, X and Y, then a
> strict majority top rated
> candidate will automatically win.  The voters don't have to agonize over
> approval cutoffs, they can just
> grade the candidates on a scale of zero to maxRange.  In fact that's what
> Andy had in mind ... an
> approval-like method that sets the cutoff level (in the sense that Bucklin
> can be thought of as a method
> for setting the approval cutoff level), but in a more robust way than
> Bucklin. In addition the composite
> method is monotone, and at least marginally clone independent (i.e. in the
> same way that Range is)..
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