[EM] SODA

[Jameson Quinn]

2011/7/6 <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

> By the way, when the delegations are done sequentially, the optimum
> strategy for each player is
> (generically) deterministic.  No mixed strategies are needed to get optimum
> game theoretic results.
>

Yes, that's the point.


>
> Because of this, a DSV (Delegated Strategy Voting) version would give the
> same result as rational
> players.
>

Yes, but I don't recommend actually using the DSV version. Having candidates
actually decide is a safeguard against candidates using dishonest strategy
in the ranking - the only phase when dishonest strategy is possible.


>
> Therefore, we finally have a monotone, clone free, DSV that takes rankings
> as input, and puts out
> rationally determined approval ballots.
>

Well, you'd have to impute the most popular ranking among a candidate's
voters to the candidate, and either use some direct approval strategy or
make fake candidates for all other rankings among a candidate's voters...
and that breaks the nice symmetry of the method somewhat, but none of it
should break the monotonicity or the clone-freeness.


>
> This should be of interest to Rob LeGrand, who has done a lot of study on
> DSV methods that turn
> rankings into approval ballots.
>
> Furthermore, this gives us a way of generating Yee diagrams for SODA, i.e.
> to make Yee diagrams for
> Approval without just assuming that Approval will always find the Condorcet
> winner.
>

Yes, that is true, with the caveats above.

JQ
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