[EM] SODA

[fsimmons at pcc.edu]

By the way, when the delegations are done sequentially, the optimum strategy for each player is 
(generically) deterministic.  No mixed strategies are needed to get optimum game theoretic results.  

Because of this, a DSV (Delegated Strategy Voting) version would give the same result as rational 
players.

Therefore, we finally have a monotone, clone free, DSV that takes rankings as input, and puts out 
rationally determined approval ballots.

This should be of interest to Rob LeGrand, who has done a lot of study on DSV methods that turn 
rankings into approval ballots.

Furthermore, this gives us a way of generating Yee diagrams for SODA, i.e. to make Yee diagrams for 
Approval without just assuming that Approval will always find the Condorcet winner.