[EM] ASCII maps showing methods' "distances"

[Jameson Quinn]

>
>
> The "Bucklin variant" mentioned below is this:
> 1. Voters specify one favorite, and any number of second preferences.
> 2. Call the first-preference winner A. All candidates "get" their first
> preferences.
> 3. All ballots that didn't rank A first, contribute their second prefs.
> 4. If A doesn't have the most prefs, add in the second prefs of voters
> who ranked A first and elect whoever has the most. Otherwise, elect A.
>
> This method guarantees LNHarm to the A voters (at least in that a second
> pref can't hurt A... certainly second preferences could hurt each other)
> and also has an interesting placement on the map.
>
> If you knew your candidate was not A, though, you are guaranteed that your
second-place votes will count, perhaps against your first-place one. In
particular, I think that the primary frontrunner would have a very hard time
getting second-place votes. Not that that represents a particularly rational
strategy for maximizing expectations, but that it is too obvious and easy a
strategy for minimizing regret.

In other words, this is not my favorite Bucklin/MCA variant. If you want to
discourage truncation in MCA, I think that you should use
truncation-resistant systems as symmetrical tiebreakers for multiple or
failed majorities. Most people will see that a truncation arms race runs
from a multiple majority down to a failed majority, see that the truncation
fails at both endpoints, and not worry too much about the places in the
middle where it might succeed.

Jameson

Jameson
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