[EM] Trying to out-do... a result! pt 2

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon Feb 21 15:44:20 PST 2011


Hi Kristofer,

--- En date de : Lun 21.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km-elmet at broadpark.no> a écrit :
> > That seems possible. As clones are eliminated they
> would boost their
> > fellow clones in the order.
> 
> On the other hand (now that I'm thinking about it), clone
> independence for a winner would not necessarily translate to
> clone independence over the whole ranking. Consider
> something like Schulze where you have 51 voting Democrats
> first and 49 voting Republicans first, then because Schulze
> is cloneproof, the number of Democratic and Republican
> candidates can't affect who wins (in this case, a Democrat).
> However, the ranking will list all the Democrats in order
> before any of the Republicans, and adding more Democrats
> will list more Democratic candidates before the ordering
> gets to the Republicans.

Sure, that's a good thing to note.

> >> I'm not sure, but I have the feeling that the
> Plurality
> >> variant would not be monotone. The IRV variant
> wouldn't be,
> >> either.
> > 
> > I think that if you don't do the Condorcet or Smith
> filter at the beginning, the Plurality version is monotone.
> 
> I forgot to say it, but I was thinking of the filtered
> versions. My implied line of reasoning was probably that
> because you originally defined the method for three
> candidates, and because a method that can only work with
> three candidates or less in total is much more limiting than
> one that can only work with three candidates or less in the
> Smith set, I considered a filter evident.

To me it wasn't obvious that the unfiltered version was monotone, so I
tried to talk through it partly for my own benefit. I could've been 
clearer about that.

I also think the unfiltered version satisfies LNHelp completely. In that
case I am surprised that KH doesn't get plotted in the Bucklin-DAC
vicinity.
 
> (You might even resurrect the "sprucing up" idea from long
> ago, because given certain criteria, you only need to define
> the base method for three candidates or less.)
> 
> The reason I felt the Smith-constrained KH with Plurality
> would be non-monotonic was because in some respect it is
> similar to Smith-constrained Plurality itself (because its
> "internal ordering", i.e. who starts off as king, is based
> on Plurality), and Smith-constrained Plurality is not
> monotone.

True, though Smith,Plurality is apparently monotone. So some questions to
test at some point, I guess:
1. Smith,KH using FPP to rank: monotone?
2. Any KH using IRV to rank: clone-proof?

Kevin


      



More information about the Election-Methods mailing list