[EM] Approval strategy

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Forest--

You wrote:

Also, going back to what you metioned before about the value of showing support for losers that you like 
better than the winner (given they have the chance of the proverbial snowflake), I think that this is perhaps 
the main rationale for extending approval all of the way down to the candidate most likely to win (and 
include that candidate only if the runner up is below it).  [That's another way to state strategy A.]

[endquote]

Ok, sure, I understand the justification. To show support for candidates better than the frontrunner
you're voting for, and who are unlikely to be a serious rival to hir, 
one could  approve all of the inbetween candidates  better
than the frontrunner that one approves.

It comes down to a question of whether you want to show that support, or whether you want to do _strictly_
instrumental voting, where you assume that even the non-frontrunner inbetween candidates have a finite
chance of being a rival to a frontrunner.

So I don't disagree with strategy A--It's merely a question of whether one wants to deal with the
inbetween candidates expressively or strictly instrumentally.


I think that the honest Approval strategy is a fascinating finding--Effective score-voting in Approval,
without randomization. That means that score voting is especially easily available in Approval. So,
having proposed Score-Voting, one could then point out that it can be easily achieved with the more modestly-
demanding Approval balloting.

As for myself, in Score-Voting, I'd probably use non-extreme points assignments only in two instances:

1. The excellent diplomatic ABE solution that you suggested for Score-Voting

2. When a candidate is about as bad as a candidate can be and still be barely acceptable,
...and so I feel that it's questionable whether s/he deserves a full approval.

In an Approval election, I'd randomize in those instances....unless honest Approval would work there too. 

Honest Approval stratgegy is probably only for someone who wants to do score voting for all the
candidates. Or maybe not. Maybe some intended maximum and minimum ratings wouldn't interfere with
voting an honest Approval ballot. Then, honest Approval voting would avoid for me, too, the task
of randomizing.

By the way, of course your Score-Voting ABE solution only works if it's known how many votes A
and B, combined, are going to get. In a first election by Approval or Score, that might not be known.
Then, maybe an A voter might have to just hold hir nose and fully approve B, to keep C from wining.

Later, when the numbers are more predictable, the A voters could use your Score/Approval ABE solution.

But that shows a big advantage of MMT, GMAT, MGMAT, MTAOC and MMABucklin

Mike Ossipoff

 		 	   		  
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