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<pre>Forest--<br><br>You wrote:<br><br>Also, going <a href="http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2011-December/029492.html#" style="text-decoration: underline;" id="_GPLITA_0" title="Powered by Text-Enhance">back</a> to what you metioned before about the value of showing support for losers that you like <br>better than the winner (given they have the chance of the proverbial snowflake), I think that this is perhaps <br>the main rationale for extending approval all of the way down to the candidate most likely to win (and <br>include that candidate only if the runner up is below it). [That's another way to state strategy A.]<br><br>[endquote]<br><br>Ok, sure, I understand the justification. To show support for candidates better than the frontrunner<br>you're voting for, and who are unlikely to be a serious rival to hir, <br>one could approve all of the inbetween candidates better<br>than the frontrunner that one approves.<br><br>It comes down to a question of whether you want to show that support, or whether you want to do _strictly_<br>instrumental voting, where you assume that even the non-frontrunner inbetween candidates have a finite<br>chance of being a rival to a frontrunner.<br><br>So I don't disagree with strategy A--It's merely a question of whether one wants to deal with the<br>inbetween candidates expressively or strictly instrumentally.<br><br><br><i>I think that the honest Approval strategy is a fascinating finding--Effective score-voting in Approval,<br>without randomization. That means that score voting is especially easily available in Approval. So,<br>having proposed Score-Voting, one could then point out that it can be easily achieved with the more modestly-<br>demanding Approval balloting.<br><br>As for myself, in Score-Voting, I'd probably use non-extreme points assignments only in two instances:<br><br>1. The excellent diplomatic ABE solution that you suggested for Score-Voting<br><br>2. When a candidate is about as bad as a candidate can be and still be barely acceptable,<br>...and so I feel that it's questionable whether s/he deserves a full approval.<br><br>In an Approval election, I'd randomize in those instances....unless honest Approval would work there too. <br><br>Honest Approval stratgegy is probably only for someone who wants to do score voting for all the<br>candidates. Or maybe not. Maybe some intended maximum and minimum ratings wouldn't interfere with<br>voting an honest Approval ballot. Then, honest Approval voting would avoid for me, too, the task<br>of randomizing.<br><br>By the way, of course your Score-Voting ABE solution only works if it's known how many votes A<br>and B, combined, are going to get. In a first election by Approval or Score, that might not be known.<br>Then, maybe an A voter might have to just hold hir nose and fully approve B, to keep C from wining.<br><br>Later, when the numbers are more predictable, the A voters could use your Score/Approval ABE solution.<br><br>But that shows a big advantage of MMT, GMAT, MGMAT, MTAOC and MMABucklin<br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br></i></pre> </div></body>
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