[EM] voters "specifically" wronged by Mono-add-Plump failure

[C.Benham]

Mike,

If you don't know what the Later-no-Help criterion is, why didn't you 
simply say so, or even make some attempt to look it up?

http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Later-no-help_criterion

And  I would prefer it if you at least keep your offensive gibes out of 
the subject line.


49: C
27: A>B
24: B>A
20: A  (new ballots that change the MMT and MAMT winner from A to C)

(120 ballots, majority threshold 61). 

A>C 71-49,   A>B 47-24,   B>C 51-49.

> I'm asking specifically who is wronged by the situation that I described.

Say in the above example all the votes are sincere, then I say 
*specifically* that the A truncators are "wronged". According to you 
(Mike O.) those voters deserve to "not benefit from" the previously existing
"mutual majority support" by having their ballots in effect not just 
ignored (given zero weight) but given *negative* weight.

I say that the algorithm should try to give equal positive weight to all 
ballots, and that those voters who burden the algorithm with the minimum 
information can very reasonably expect that the algorithm will succeed  
in not  giving their ballots (in effect) negative weight.

But say for a moment that I accept Mike's proposition that the 20A 
truncators got what they deserved because of their stupidity or laziness 
or ingratitude or whatever. What about the other 51 voters who prefer A 
to C? Do they deserve to have their win snatched away from them by the 
intrusion of those stupid yokels (the A truncators)?  Haven't *they* 
been "wronged"?


49: A
48: B
03: C>B


> B pairwise beats A, and is CW. Condorcet's Criterion is incompatible
> with FBC. Various different FBC-complying methods, and especially FBC/ABE
> methods, will fail CC in various ways, some CC failures being bigger than
> others--a matter of degree. But they all fail CC. Maybe you're a strict
> Condorcetist, and I don't criticize you for that. We needn't all have the
> same goals, values and purposes.


When, on learning that compliance with the FBC and the Condorcet 
criterion are incompatible one decides that FBC is more important and so 
changes (as Mike has) from a "Condorcetist" to a supporter of 
FBC-complying methods, I would think that one would be looking for some 
weakened version (or versions) of the Condorcet criterion that *are* 
compatible the FBC and not simply start happily embracing any failure of 
Condorcet, almost no matter how bad.

For example FBC compliance is compatible with Kevin Venzke's  "Tied  at 
the Top Rule" weakening of the Condorcet criterion, and I doubt that FBC 
compliance is incompatible with Condorcet Loser
(as failed in my first example).

(I'm inferring a criterion from part of Kevin's suggested "ICA" method. 
That criterion says that if there are any candidates who pairwise beat 
all the other candidates using the special tied-at-the-top rule then the 
winner must be one of them. In situations where there is no equal-top 
ranking/rating it says the same thing as the Condorcet criterion.)

http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Tied_at_the_top

http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica

Chris Benham



Mike Ossipoff wrote (16 Dec 2011):

Chris:

You said:

In an earlier message of yours (the last one I responded to) you wrote:

 > MAMT is an addition to the list of FBC/ABE methods to choose from.
 > People should be looking into its properties. Tell me what you know,
 > so far, about its properties, ...


That is almost the only thing I did. You didn't ask me to confine myself
to properties that I personally think are *important* or to explain why
I think they are important.

[endquote]

I wasn't criticizing you there. I was merely asking Forest about MAMT.

 > You said that MMT fails Later-No-Help:
 >
 >  With MMT, you can help your favorite by entering into a mutually-chosen,
 >  mutually-supported, majority coalition. Everyone supporting that
 > coalition
 >  does so because they consider it beneficial to their interest.
 >
 >  How is that a "failure"??

You replied:
 
I assume you know what the criterion specifies and are asking me why
meeting Later-no-Help is a good thing.

[endquote]

You assume wrong. I meant what I said. Re-read the last two paragraphs 
of mine
that you quoted above. If you don't have an answer to it, then that's ok. I
accept that you don't.

No, I'm not asking you about generalities regarding a criterion. I'm asking
specifically who is wronged by the situation that I described.

You continued:

Failing LNHelp while meeting
LHHarm creates a random-fill incentive.
 One of the problems with that is
that is unfair to sincere truncators. Why should they be penalised for
declining to play silly games with candidates they don't care about?
Another is that all methods that fail LNHelp are vulnerable to Burial
strategy.

[endquote]

That's what I mean by repetition of generalities such as your criteria,
and such as "unfair to sincere truncators" and "burial strategy", etc.

I asked you specifically about situations with MMT. I asked who is 
wronged therein.
I didn't ask for repetition about generalities.

I've told why your criteria, and your terms such as those in the 
paragraph before
last, don't describe problems with MMT results and situations.


 > You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd:
 >
 >  I don't know what that criterion is.

It is a weakened version of Smith that is compatible with LNHelp
compliance (and so Burial Invulnerability) and also compliance with
LNHarm. It says that that if there is a subset S of candidates that on
more than a third of the ballots are voted strictly above all the
outside-S candidates and all the S candidates pairwise-beat all the
outside-S candidates then the winner must come from S.

 From your recent past statements I know I don't have to sell the
desirability of compliance with this to you. I gave this example:

49: A
48: B
03: C>B

I can't take seriously any method that doesn't elect B here. Can you? 
Isn't this just the sort of small (probably wing) "spoiler" scenario
that motivates many to support electoral reform?

[endquote]

B pairwise beats A, and is CW. Condorcet's Criterion is incompatible
with FBC. Various different FBC-complying methods, and especially FBC/ABE
methods, will fail CC in various ways, some CC failures being bigger than
others--a matter of degree. But they all fail CC. Maybe you're a strict
Condorcetist, and I don't criticize you for that. We needn't all have the
same goals, values and purposes.

In your example, there's something favoring A and there's something 
favoting B.
A is better in 1st choice ratings. B has more (1st place + 2nd place) 
support. It's
a toss-up, unless your goal is to elect the pairwise winner and the CW.

 > You said that MMT fails Mono-Add-Plump:
 >
 >  I've already commented on that a few times.


Yes, and I obliquely responded to your comment. But to be blunt, if
failure of Mono-add-Plump isn't self-evidently *completely ridiculous*
(and so much so that anything not compatible with Mono-add-Plump
compliance is thereby made a complete nonsense of), then I have no idea
what is.

[endquote]

Not good enough. I asked you specifically what is wrong with situations and
results that I described for MMT.

Angry noises may serve to vent your anger, but they don't answer my 
question.

Could it be that you're evading my questions about what is wrong, unfair
or surprising about the MMT situations and results that I asked you about?

You continued:


This doesn't come anywhere near cutting it:

 > Your favorite initially won only because of mutual majority support.
 > The plumpers
 > declined that mutual support, as is their right. Having declined
 > mutual support,
 > should it be surprising or unfair if they no longer have it?

Is it "surprising or unfair" that some new voters should in effect have
their ballots given negative weight because they refused to play silly
games with some candidates they weren't interested in and maybe knew
nothing about?

Err....*yes*.


[endquote]

Err...You mean "silly games like mutual majority coalition support? :-)

If they think that is silly, then they certainly have the right to 
decline it...
and then not benefit from it.


Mike Ossipoff