[EM] Chris: What LNHe is. Your example.

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Chris:

This is a reply to one statement in your most recent posting today,
and to your example that you posted yesterday:

You said:

If you don't know what the Later-no-Help criterion is, why didn't you
simply say so...

[endquote]

If I didn't say so, then how have you determined it :-)

You continued:

...or even make some attempt to look it up?

[endquote]

In which part of my reply below, did I say that I didn't know what
LNHe is?

You'd said:

I assume that you know what the criterion specifies and are asking
me why meeting Later-no-Help is a good thing.

[endquote]

I'd replied: 

You assume wrong. I meant what I said. Re-read the last two paragraphs
of mine that you quoted above. If you don't have an answer to it, then 
that's ok. I accept that you don't.

No, I'm not asking you about generalities regarding a criterion. I'm asking
specifically who is wronged by the situation that I described.

So, again, which part of my reply there says that I didn't know what LNHe is?

I'd made it abundantly clear that the incorrect part of your assumption regarded
what you assumed that I was asking you.

A few words regarding your example yesterday:

You'd said:

49: A
48: B
03: C>B

I can't take seriously any method that doesn't elect B here. Can you?
Isn't this just the sort of small (probably wing) "spoiler" scenario that
motivates many to support electoral reform?

[endquote]


To answer your last question first, of course it is. That's why MMT, GMAT, MTAOC,
MMPO and MDDTR give voters an easy way to avoid that problem in your example.

(as, of course, do various other proposed methods)

Yes, in MMT, GMAT and MTAOC (if the C voters' middle rating of B is conditional), A 
wins in your example, because the B voters declined the {B,C} mutual support coalition.
That is their right, of course.

Maybe you're saying that you want to criticize those methods based on that example.

If so, then you must be clear about what you mean in your criticism.

Sure, B should win, and would win (even if not by the voting that you showed).

I'm guessing that you mean that, because you're used to the longstanding automatic assumption
that help to a compromise is unconditional, necessarily offered as one-sided and non-mutual,
then that's how it should be--because it's what you're used to.

There's nothing wrong with curmudgeonly conservative traditionalism (well maybe),
but it doesn't constitute an argument.

Your longstanding tradition results in often sending, to voters who want to support a
majority coalition, the message "You help, you lose".

Yes, MMT is a different kind of method. Not what you're used to. Yes, in MMT, the
B voters must middle-rate C in order to benefit from majority coalition support from
C. They must accept that mutual support coalition. MMT treats majority coalition
as necessarily mutual.

Is that inconvenient for the B voters? Oh I feel their pain!  :-)

How terribly difficult it must be for them to accept the mutual coalition
that they want to benefit from.

That inconvenience is due to a precaution that makes possible the complete elimination
of the co-operation/defection problem, the ABE problem, the chicken dilemma.

Which do you think is the worse problem? Which problem can be more of
an unsolvable problem for voters?

(I'll just briefly mention that, in MTAOC, the C voters could make their middle-rating
of B unconditional if they choose to. If it's known that C is very unlikely to have
B's popularity and winnability, then they could and might do so. But the trouble with that
is that sometimes it isn't really known which candidate is bigger. Then, neither the
B or C voters should make an assumption about that. Therefore, the simpler 
always-mutual-only coalition support of MMT is really good enough. I'll just add that
, even with conditional middle ratings, MTAOC like GMAT and MMPO, meets Mono-Add-Plump.)

You've been just repeating about "burial incentive", "random-fill incentive", LNHe,
etc. In previous recent posts, I've specifically answered each of those objections,
describing the kind of situations that they (try to) refer to in MMT. In so doing,
I showed that those terms do not point to a problem in MMT. In that sense, they're
obsolete with respect to MMT. 

As I said, MMT is a new kind of method.

This has been a reply to your example quoted above, and to one statement in your
most recent posting.

Mike Ossipoff












[endquote]

I assume you know what the criterion specifies and are asking me why 
meeting Later-no-Help is a good thing.

[endquote]

You assume wrong. I meant what I said. Re-read the last two paragraphs of mine
that you quoted above. If you don't have an answer to it, then that's ok. I
accept that you don't.

No, I'm not asking you about generalities regarding a criterion. I'm asking
specifically who is wronged by the situation that I described.

You continued:

Failing LNHelp while meeting 
LHHarm creates a random-fill incentive.
 One of the problems with that is 
that is unfair to sincere truncators. Why should they be penalised for 
declining to play silly games with candidates they don't care about?
Another is that all methods that fail LNHelp are vulnerable to Burial 
strategy.

[endquote]

That's what I mean by repetition of generalities such as your criteria,
and such as "unfair to sincere truncators" and "burial strategy", etc.

I asked you specifically about situations with MMT. I asked who is wronged therein.
I didn't ask for repetition about generalities.

I've told why your criteria, and your terms such as those in the paragraph before
last, don't describe problems with MMT results and situations.


 > You said that MMT fails Mutual Dominant 3rd:
>
>  I don't know what that criterion is.

It is a weakened version of Smith that is compatible with LNHelp 
compliance (and so Burial Invulnerability) and also compliance with 
LNHarm. It says that that if there is a subset S of candidates that on 
more than a third of the ballots are voted strictly above all the 
outside-S candidates and all the S candidates pairwise-beat all the 
outside-S candidates then the winner must come from S.

 From your recent past statements I know I don't have to sell the 
desirability of compliance with this to you. I gave this example:

49: A
48: B
03: C>B

I can't take seriously any method that doesn't elect B here. Can you?  
Isn't this just the sort of small (probably wing) "spoiler" scenario 
that motivates many to support electoral reform?